568 F.2d 1369 (D.C. Cir. 1977)
Natural Resources Defense Council v. Costle is a foundational Clean Water Act case that anchors the modern understanding of the statute's central permitting program—the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES).
May EPA, by regulation, categorically exempt entire classes of point sources from the Clean Water Act's NPDES permit requirements based on considerations such as administrative burden or de minimis environmental impact?
Under § 301(a) of the Clean Water Act, "the discharge of any pollutant by any person shall be unlawful" except in compliance with enumerated provisions, including § 402's NPDES program. The Act's broad definition of "point source," coupled with the absence of general statutory exemptions, means that all discharges from point sources must be authorized by permits unless Congress expressly provides otherwise. An agency may not promulgate regulations that are contrary to the statute's clear command (5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), (C)). While EPA lacks authority to create categorical exemptions, it retains wide discretion to administer the NPDES program efficiently—including through general or area permits, prioritization, and streamlined procedures—so long as statutory coverage is preserved.
No. EPA lacks authority to categorically exempt classes of point sources from NPDES permitting requirements. The court set aside the blanket exclusions and remanded to EPA, emphasizing that administrative tools such as general permits and prioritization, rather than wholesale exemptions, must be used to manage programmatic burdens.
NRDC v. Costle stands for the proposition that agencies cannot carve out categorical exclusions from clear statutory coverage absent explicit congressional authorization. It anchors the Clean Water Act's point source/nonpoint source distinction and solidifies the NPDES program's comprehensive reach. The case also legitimized the use of general permits and other administrative mechanisms to manage large permitting universes, shaping modern permitting practice. Its legacy is evident in later statutory amendments: after the decision, Congress itself crafted targeted exemptions (e.g., for certain agricultural return flows in 1977 and later stormwater frameworks in 1987), underscoring that any narrowing of the program must come from Congress, not agency fiat. For law students, the case is a touchstone in both environmental law and administrative law for textual fidelity, limits on agency discretion, and pragmatic program administration.