Former child laborers from Mali alleged they were trafficked to and forced to work on cocoa farms in Côte d'Ivoire, where they endured hazardous conditions and physical abuse. They sued Nestlé USA and Cargill (U.S.-based corporations) under the Alien Tort Statute, asserting the companies knowingly aided and abetted child slavery by, among other things, purchasing cocoa from farms that used child labor, providing financial and technical support to those farms, and maintaining supply-chain relationships despite knowledge of the abuses. Plaintiffs further alleged that high-level operational decisions—such as policies, financing, oversight, and supplier relationships—were made in the United States and enabled or encouraged the continuation of child slavery abroad. The district court dismissed, but the Ninth Circuit allowed aiding-and-abetting claims to proceed after plaintiffs amended to emphasize U.S.-based corporate decision-making. The Supreme Court granted certiorari (in a consolidated posture with Cargill, Inc. v. Doe I) to determine whether the ATS permitted such claims premised largely on overseas conduct, with only general corporate activity occurring domestically.
Does the Alien Tort Statute permit suits against U.S. corporations for aiding and abetting human rights abuses occurring overseas when the plaintiffs allege only general corporate activity and decision-making within the United States as the domestic nexus?
The ATS is a jurisdictional statute that permits federal courts to recognize a narrow set of federal common law causes of action for violations of specific, universal, and obligatory international norms (Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain). ATS claims are subject to the presumption against extraterritoriality (Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum; RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Community). To state a permissible domestic application, the complaint must plausibly allege that the conduct relevant to the statute's focus occurred in the United States; mere corporate presence or general corporate activity or decision-making is insufficient. Courts must exercise great caution before extending ATS liability to new contexts or categories of defendants, particularly where doing so would entail foreign policy and separation-of-powers concerns.
No. Allegations of general corporate activity and decision-making in the United States are insufficient to state a domestic application of the ATS for aiding and abetting child slavery occurring abroad. Because nearly all the relevant conduct occurred in Côte d'Ivoire, the claims are impermissibly extraterritorial. The Court reversed the Ninth Circuit and declined to decide whether corporations may be defendants under the ATS or whether aiding-and-abetting liability is cognizable in ATS actions.
The Court began by reaffirming that the ATS is jurisdictional and that any implied causes of action recognized under it must be tightly cabined, as Sosa cautioned, to modern analogs of 18th-century paradigms and norms accepted as specific, universal, and obligatory. Building on Kiobel and RJR Nabisco, the Court applied the presumption against extraterritoriality, which requires plaintiffs to plead a domestic application of the statute by identifying domestic conduct relevant to the statute's focus. The plaintiffs' allegations centered on child slavery in Côte d'Ivoire and on the defendants' overseas supply-chain conduct. Their asserted U.S. nexus—general corporate decision-making, financing, and supervision—mirrored the kind of "mere corporate presence" or generic operational activity that Kiobel deemed insufficient. Thus, the claims did not "touch and concern" the United States with sufficient force to overcome the presumption; nor did they satisfy RJR Nabisco's domestic-application framework. Separately, the Court underscored the separation-of-powers concerns inherent in recognizing new ATS causes of action, particularly aiding-and-abetting liability against corporate defendants for conduct abroad. Such line-drawing implicates foreign relations and policy judgments—areas where Congress, not the judiciary, is institutionally suited to act. Congress has legislated specifically with respect to human trafficking and forced labor, including comprehensive schemes like the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act, signaling that calibrated legislative solutions are available. Because the case could be resolved on extraterritoriality grounds, the Court declined to decide whether corporations can be sued under the ATS or whether aiding-and-abetting liability exists under the ATS. Multiple Justices filed separate opinions reflecting differing views on the scope of potential ATS liability and on the viability of aiding-and-abetting theories, but there was broad agreement that the allegations here did not plead a domestic application.
Nestlé USA v. Doe I significantly narrows ATS litigation against U.S. corporations for overseas misconduct by clarifying that general domestic corporate activity—such as policymaking, financing decisions, or compliance oversight—is not enough to overcome the presumption against extraterritoriality. The decision pushes would-be plaintiffs to identify concrete domestic conduct tied to the violation itself and signals judicial reluctance to expand ATS causes of action without clear congressional authorization. For law students, the case is a key study in statutory interpretation (extraterritoriality), the limits of federal common lawmaking under Sosa, and the interplay among Kiobel, Jesner, and RJR Nabisco. It also highlights practical litigation strategy: plaintiffs may need to look to alternative statutory schemes (e.g., TVPRA) or state-law claims for remedies related to supply-chain abuses.
Nestlé USA v. Doe I tightens the limits on using the ATS to police corporate involvement in overseas human rights abuses. By holding that general domestic corporate activity is insufficient to overcome the presumption against extraterritoriality, the Court significantly narrows the circumstances in which U.S. corporations can face ATS liability for conduct tied to foreign supply chains.