505 U.S. 144 (1992)
New York v. United States is a cornerstone of modern federalism and the leading case on the anti-commandeering doctrine.
Does the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985 violate the Tenth Amendment by compelling states to enact or administer a federal regulatory program, specifically through the take title provision, and are the Act's other incentives constitutional exercises of federal power?
Under the anti-commandeering doctrine, Congress may not compel states to enact or administer a federal regulatory program. The Tenth Amendment preserves state sovereignty as a structural limit on federal power. Congress may encourage state participation by: (1) regulating private actors directly under its enumerated powers (e.g., the Commerce Clause); (2) offering financial incentives or conditional grants under the Spending Clause, provided conditions are unambiguous and not coercive; and (3) employing conditional preemption that gives states a choice between regulating according to federal standards or allowing the federal government to regulate directly. However, Congress cannot require a state to legislate, regulate, or take title to property as a means of enforcing federal policy.
The take title provision unconstitutionally commandeers state governments in violation of the Tenth Amendment and is invalid. The monetary incentives and access incentives are constitutional exercises of Congress's Spending Clause and Commerce Clause powers. The unconstitutional provision is severable, and the remainder of the Act is upheld.
New York v. United States is the foundational modern statement of the anti-commandeering doctrine. It establishes that Congress cannot force state legislatures or executives to implement federal regulatory programs, preserving clear lines of political accountability and respecting state sovereignty. The case delineates permissible tools of cooperative federalism—conditional spending, conditional preemption, and direct regulation of private actors—while rejecting federal commands directed at states. Its principles were extended in Printz v. United States, which barred commandeering of state executive officers, and reaffirmed in Murphy v. NCAA, which clarified that Congress cannot command states to refrain from enacting laws either. For law students, the case is essential for understanding the Tenth Amendment, federalism limits, and doctrinal distinctions between preemption, inducement, and commandeering.