The petitioner, a Guatemalan national, entered the United States without inspection and resided here for years. In 2013, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) served him with a document titled a "Notice to Appear" (NTA) initiating removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a). That NTA, however, did not specify the time and place of his initial hearing—information expressly listed in § 1229(a)(1)(G)(i) among the mandatory contents of an NTA. Instead, as was common practice, the government later mailed one or more hearing notices specifying dates and times. When the petitioner sought cancellation of removal for certain nonpermanent residents under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b), the government invoked the stop-time rule, § 1229b(d)(1), arguing that service of the 2013 NTA (together with later hearing notices) had already stopped the accrual of his continuous physical presence, leaving him short of the ten years required. The immigration judge and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA)—relying on the BIA's post-Pereira precedent allowing a two-step approach—agreed with the government, and the Sixth Circuit affirmed. The petitioner sought Supreme Court review, contending that the stop-time rule is triggered only by service of a single document that itself contains all the information § 1229(a)(1) requires, including the time and place of the hearing.
Does the stop-time rule in 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(d)(1) get triggered when the government serves a noncitizen with an initial notice to appear that lacks the time and place of the hearing but later sends supplemental notices with that information, or does the statute require service of a single, complete notice to appear containing all of § 1229(a)(1)'s required information?
Under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(d)(1), the stop-time rule is triggered "when the alien is served a notice to appear under section 1229(a)." Section 1229(a)(1) defines "a notice to appear" as a single written notice "specifying" the information enumerated in subparagraphs (A)–(G), including "the time and place at which the proceedings will be held." To trigger the stop-time rule, the government must serve one document that itself contains all of § 1229(a)(1)'s required information; service via multiple, later-in-time documents does not suffice.
No. The government must serve a single, statutorily compliant notice to appear that includes the time and place of the hearing to trigger the stop-time rule. A defective notice to appear that omits those details cannot be cured by later supplemental notices for purposes of § 1229b(d)(1). The Supreme Court reversed the judgment below.
The Court, in an opinion by Justice Gorsuch, grounded its analysis in the statutory text and grammar. The stop-time rule triggers "when the alien is served a notice to appear under section 1229(a)." Congress used the singular article "a" to describe a notice to appear, signaling a single document rather than a series. Section 1229(a)(1) then lists the information that such a notice must specify, including the time and place of the hearing. Reading the two provisions together, a "notice to appear under § 1229(a)" means one written notice that, on its face, contains all the enumerated details. The government's piecemeal approach—supplying time and place later—conflicts with this structure, blurs the statute's demand for a discrete triggering event ("when" service occurs), and invites uncertainty about when accrual actually stops. The Court rejected arguments from administrative convenience, emphasizing that policy concerns cannot override clear statutory commands. Congress wrote a detailed, specific notice regime, and it is not the Court's role to dilute it to accommodate docketing difficulties. The Court also noted that Congress, in the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, replaced older charging documents with a unified "notice to appear," further supporting the single-document understanding. Any residual ambiguity would be resolved against the government under longstanding interpretive principles favoring the noncitizen in deportation statutes, but the Court found the text sufficiently clear without resort to a tie-breaker. Accordingly, because the petitioner received an initial NTA that lacked time and place and only later received separate notices supplying that information, he was never served "a notice to appear under § 1229(a)" that could trigger the stop-time rule. The Court thus reversed and remanded.
For immigration law, Niz-Chavez cements that the stop-time rule hinges on a single, compliant charging document, not a mosaic of notices. Practically, it meant that many noncitizens who received defective NTAs continued to accrue continuous presence for cancellation of removal until the government served a proper, one-piece notice. For law students, the case is a study in precise textualism: the force of an article ("a"), the function of cross-references, and how statutory structure can resolve high-volume administrative disputes. It also illustrates the Court's reluctance to subordinate unambiguous statutory text to efficiency arguments, and the decision's aftermath reshaped agency charging practices nationwide.
Niz-Chavez v. Garland underscores that statutory words—and even small ones like the article "a"—carry controlling force. By insisting that the stop-time rule is triggered only by a single, complete notice to appear containing all mandated information, the Court enforced Congress's detailed charging scheme and rejected efforts to relax those requirements in the name of efficiency.