516 U.S. 85 (1995)
NLRB v. Town & Country Electric is a foundational Supreme Court decision in labor law clarifying that paid union organizers—often called "salts"—who apply for jobs are covered as "employees" under Section 2(3) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).
Are paid union organizers who apply for work—commonly known as "salts"—covered as "employees" under Section 2(3) of the NLRA, and thus protected from discriminatory refusal to hire or discharge based on union considerations?
Under the NLRA, Section 2(3) broadly defines "employee" and excludes only narrow categories (e.g., supervisors, independent contractors). Consistent with Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, applicants for employment are treated as "employees" for purposes of Section 8(a)(3)'s prohibition on discrimination "in regard to hire." Applying Chevron deference, the NLRB's interpretation that paid union organizers who genuinely seek to work for an employer qualify as "employees"—even if simultaneously employed by a union and intending to organize—is a permissible and reasonable construction of the Act.
Yes. Paid union organizers who apply for jobs are "employees" under Section 2(3) of the NLRA. The Supreme Court reversed the Eighth Circuit and upheld the NLRB's interpretation as reasonable under Chevron.
Town & Country is a cornerstone case in labor law and administrative law. Substantively, it validates "salting" as a lawful organizing method by ensuring that paid union organizers are protected from discriminatory refusals to hire or discharges. Practically, it means employers cannot exclude applicants solely due to union sponsorship or organizing intent, though they may apply neutral hiring criteria and enforce lawful work rules. Doctrinally, it underscores Chevron deference to the NLRB's reasonable interpretations of the NLRA, and it reaffirms Phelps Dodge's inclusion of applicants within the Act's protections. For law students, the case is essential for understanding the breadth of "employee" under Section 2(3), the protection of hiring-stage rights under Section 8(a)(3), and the interplay between statutory text, labor policy, and agency deference.