Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010)
Padilla v. Kentucky is a landmark Sixth Amendment case at the intersection of criminal procedure and immigration law.
Does the Sixth Amendment require defense counsel to advise a noncitizen client about the risk of deportation arising from a guilty plea, and can failure to provide correct advice on clear immigration consequences constitute ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland v. Washington?
Under the Sixth Amendment, as applied through Strickland v. Washington, counsel must provide reasonably effective assistance during plea negotiations. This includes advising a noncitizen client about the immigration consequences of a guilty plea. When the law is succinct, clear, and explicit that a conviction will result in deportation, counsel must correctly advise that deportation is presumptively mandatory. When the immigration consequences are unclear or uncertain, counsel must, at minimum, advise that the plea may carry a risk of adverse immigration consequences. A defendant claiming ineffective assistance must still satisfy Strickland's two-prong test: (1) deficient performance and (2) prejudice, i.e., a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the defendant would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.
Yes. The Sixth Amendment requires defense counsel to provide advice about the risk of deportation resulting from a guilty plea. Counsel's failure to correctly advise, or affirmative misadvice, concerning clear deportation consequences constitutes deficient performance under Strickland. The Court reversed the Kentucky Supreme Court's contrary collateral-consequences rule and remanded for consideration of Strickland prejudice.
Padilla transformed plea-bargaining practice by constitutionalizing a defense attorney's duty to advise noncitizen clients about deportation risks. It ensures that pleas are truly informed and aligns constitutional standards with professional norms. For law students, Padilla illustrates: (1) how Strickland's performance prong is applied to pre-plea advice; (2) the limits of the direct/collateral consequence framework; and (3) the Court's sensitivity to the real-world effects of convictions beyond incarceration. The case also spawned extensive practice changes, including routine immigration screenings in defender offices and judicial colloquies that reference immigration consequences. Padilla's reach is tempered by subsequent decisions. In Chaidez v. United States (2013), the Court held Padilla is not retroactive to convictions that became final before 2010. Relief still requires proving prejudice, which is often litigated and may turn on contemporaneous evidence of the defendant's priorities, plausible defenses, and the availability of alternative pleas that would have mitigated immigration harm. Padilla remains a cornerstone for effective assistance in the plea context and a touchstone in evaluating counsel's duties regarding severe, closely linked consequences of conviction.