Pennsylvania R.R. Co. v. Chamberlain, 288 U.S. 333 (1933) (U.S. Supreme Court), 53 S. Ct. 391, 77 L. Ed. 819
Pennsylvania Railroad Co. v.
Whether a plaintiff's case under FELA, premised on a violent collision causing a worker's fatal fall, can properly go to the jury when the circumstantial evidence is equally consistent with non-negligent explanations and does not provide a substantial evidentiary basis for inferring negligence and causation.
A verdict cannot rest on speculation or conjecture. Where the proved facts give equal support to inconsistent inferences—one of liability and the other of non-liability—the choice between them is mere guesswork, and the plaintiff has not carried the burden of proof. In FELA cases as in others, there must be substantial evidence upon which a jury can reasonably find negligence and causation; a mere scintilla or an inference built on equally plausible alternatives is insufficient.
No. The plaintiff's evidence did not provide a substantial basis to infer a violent, negligent collision caused the decedent's fall; instead, it left the cause to conjecture. The verdict for the plaintiff could not stand, and judgment should have been directed for the railroad.
Chamberlain is a core authority on the limits of circumstantial proof and the standard for taking a case from the jury via directed verdict or JNOV. It teaches that plaintiffs must do more than present a possible theory of negligence; they must supply substantial evidence that reasonably favors their theory over non-liability alternatives. In FELA litigation, Chamberlain tempers jury deference by insisting on a threshold of probative facts linking negligence to injury. The case is often contrasted with Lavender v. Kurn, which stresses deference to jury inferences when there is any reasonable evidentiary basis; the pair helps students understand how courts police the line between permissible inference and impermissible speculation.