After a heated confrontation in a New York apartment, one man (not the defendant) fired several shots at the eventual victim, who fell onto a couch. Moments later, defendant David Dlugash approached the victim at close range and fired several additional shots into the victim's head and face. At trial, medical testimony could not conclusively establish whether the victim was alive when Dlugash fired. The prosecution charged Dlugash with murder (among other offenses), and a jury convicted him of murder in the second degree. On appeal, the central difficulty was evidentiary: the record would not permit a finding beyond a reasonable doubt that the victim was alive at the time of Dlugash's shots (a prerequisite for murder), yet Dlugash's words and conduct supported the inference that he intended to kill and believed the victim to be alive when he fired.
Whether a defendant can be held liable for attempted murder where it is uncertain (or even impossible) that the victim was alive at the time of the defendant's shots—i.e., whether impossibility is a defense to attempt when the offense would have been completed had the circumstances been as the defendant believed them to be.
Under New York Penal Law § 110.10 (and consistent with the Model Penal Code), impossibility is not a defense to attempt if the crime would have been committed had the circumstances been as the actor believed them to be. Attempt liability is assessed by the circumstances as the defendant believes them to exist at the time of the conduct; thus, a defendant may be guilty of attempt even if completion was factually or legally impossible under the actual circumstances.
The New York Court of Appeals set aside the murder conviction because the People failed to prove the victim was alive when the defendant fired but concluded that, under § 110.10, the defendant could be convicted of attempted murder since the jury could find he intended to kill and believed the victim to be alive. The court modified the judgment to reflect attempted murder and remanded for appropriate proceedings.
The court explained that traditional distinctions between factual and legal impossibility produced arbitrary results that turned on happenstance rather than culpability. New York's statutory framework (Penal Law § 110.10) and the MPC focus on the actor's mens rea and the dangerousness revealed by his conduct, measured by the circumstances as he perceived them. Here, the state's proof did not meet the burden for murder because life at the time of the defendant's shots could not be established beyond a reasonable doubt; murder requires the killing of a living human being. But the evidence sufficed for attempt. The defendant fired multiple rounds into the victim's head at close range immediately after another shooter had fired, from which a jury could infer an intent to cause death and a belief that the victim was alive when the defendant acted. Because § 110.10 eliminates impossibility as a defense where the crime would have been completed as the actor believed, the uncertainty (or impossibility) that the victim was then alive does not bar attempt liability. The court emphasized that attempt law aims to punish actors whose conduct strongly corroborates their criminal purpose, even if external facts frustrate completion. The court therefore reconciled two principles: (1) no murder without proof of a living victim at the time of the fatal act, and (2) attempt liability grounded in the defendant's purpose and perception. The proper disposition was to reduce the conviction to attempted murder—a lesser-included offense supported by the record—and remand for sentencing on that offense.
Dlugash is the leading New York case (and a widely cited authority nationwide) on impossibility and attempt. It endorses the MPC-inspired, belief-centered analysis and discards the rigid factual/legal impossibility divide. For law students, it illuminates how attempt punishes dangerous purpose and substantial steps rather than completed harm, and it demonstrates appellate modification to lesser-included offenses when proof fails on an element (here, the victim's being alive) unique to the completed crime. The case provides a template for analyzing classic hypotheticals like pickpocketing an empty pocket or shooting into an empty bed: liability turns on the actor's intent and the circumstances as the actor believed them to be.
People v. Dlugash pivots attempt doctrine away from rigid taxonomies of impossibility and toward a principled focus on culpability, aligning New York with the MPC. By measuring attempt against the defendant's beliefs at the time of acting, the court preserves accountability for dangerous actors even when external facts prevent or negate completion of the offense.