400 U.S. 542 (U.S. 1971) (per curiam)
Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp.
Whether, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, an employer may refuse to accept job applications from women with pre-school-age children while accepting applications from men with pre-school-age children, absent proof that sex is a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) for the position.
Title VII § 703(a)(1) makes it an unlawful employment practice for an employer to fail or refuse to hire or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because of such individual's sex. An employer may not maintain different hiring standards for similarly situated men and women. The sole statutory exception relevant here is the BFOQ defense, § 703(e)(1), which allows sex-based distinctions only where sex is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the particular business. The BFOQ exception is narrow, and the employer bears the burden of proof.
An employer may not have one hiring policy for women with pre-school-age children and another for men with pre-school-age children; such a policy constitutes sex discrimination under Title VII unless the employer can prove that sex is a bona fide occupational qualification for the job. Because the record contained no findings on BFOQ, summary judgment for the employer was improper. The judgment was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings.
Phillips is the Supreme Court's first major foray into sex discrimination under Title VII and a foundational case for the "sex-plus" doctrine. It clarifies that an employer cannot evade Title VII by targeting a subset of women (e.g., mothers of preschoolers) while not imposing the same condition on similarly situated men. The case also reinforces two enduring features of Title VII litigation: (1) the primacy of equal treatment between comparably situated men and women, and (2) the narrow scope and employer's burden to prove a BFOQ. For law students, Phillips provides a clean, early example of disparate treatment based on sex and a template for analyzing facially discriminatory policies, comparators, and statutory defenses under Title VII.