Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (U.S. Supreme Court)
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins is a foundational Title VII case that reshaped how courts analyze discrimination claims when both legitimate and illegitimate reasons motivate an employer's decision.
When a Title VII plaintiff proves that an employer's decision was motivated in part by an impermissible factor such as sex, what is the proper burden-shifting framework and standard of proof for the employer to avoid liability, and does decisionmaking based on sex stereotypes constitute discrimination "because of sex"?
Under Title VII, once a plaintiff proves that a protected characteristic was a motivating factor in an adverse employment decision, the burden of persuasion shifts to the employer to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that it would have made the same decision even if it had not considered the impermissible factor. Decisionmaking that rests on sex-based stereotypes is discrimination "because of sex." (Note: The Civil Rights Act of 1991 subsequently codified mixed-motive liability in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) and modified remedies where the employer proves the same-decision defense, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B).)
Yes. The Court held that sex stereotyping is actionable sex discrimination under Title VII and that, in mixed-motive cases where the plaintiff proves that sex played a motivating part, the burden shifts to the employer to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have made the same decision absent the discriminatory motive. Applying this clarified framework, the Court vacated and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its allocation and standard of proof.
Price Waterhouse established the mixed-motive framework in Title VII cases and firmly recognized sex stereotyping as unlawful discrimination. The case clarifies how burdens of persuasion move once discriminatory motive is shown to have actually influenced the decision, distinguishing mixed-motive from pretext analysis under McDonnell Douglas. Congress later codified mixed-motive liability in the Civil Rights Act of 1991, maintaining the same-decision defense but limiting remedies rather than eliminating liability. For law students, the case is essential to understanding proof structures in employment discrimination, the evolution of remedies post-1991, and the doctrinal roots of later sex-stereotyping and sex-based discrimination jurisprudence.