14 Cal. 4th 1066, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 263, 929 P.2d 582 (Cal. 1997)
Randi W. v.
Do former employers and their administrators who write letters of recommendation owe a duty to refrain from affirmative misrepresentations that create a foreseeable risk of physical harm to third parties, and, if so, to what extent do California's public-entity and public-employee misrepresentation immunities bar such claims?
A person who chooses to write a job recommendation owes a duty not to make affirmative misrepresentations or misleading half-truths that, in light of known facts, create a substantial, foreseeable risk of physical harm to third persons (Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 310, 311; Rowland v. Christian duty factors). There is no broad, affirmative duty to disclose all negative information; however, once one speaks, one must not mislead by material omissions. Public entities are immune from liability for injuries caused by misrepresentation under Cal. Gov't Code § 818.8. Public employees are immune for misrepresentation, whether negligent or intentional, unless they are guilty of actual fraud, corruption, or actual malice. Cal. Gov't Code § 822.2.
Yes. The writers of employment recommendations owe a limited duty to refrain from making affirmative misstatements or misleading half-truths that create a foreseeable risk of physical injury to third persons. The complaint adequately stated a cause of action under that duty. However, public entities are immune from misrepresentation liability under § 818.8. Public employees are immune from negligent misrepresentation under § 822.2 but may be liable for intentional misrepresentation or where actual fraud, corruption, or malice is adequately alleged. Accordingly, claims against the school district entities were barred, but claims against individual administrators could proceed to the extent they alleged actionable, non-immune misconduct.
Randi W. is a staple in torts for its nuanced treatment of duty to third persons in the context of employment references. It is frequently taught for the proposition that: (1) there is no general duty to disclose, but affirmative misstatements and misleading half-truths can be actionable when they create a foreseeable risk of physical harm; (2) negligent misrepresentation can support recovery for physical, not just economic, injury (Restatement § 311); and (3) plaintiffs must navigate governmental immunities carefully—public entities are broadly immune for misrepresentation, while individual public employees may face liability only for intentional fraud or malice. The case also offers a practical lesson: speakers can avoid liability by declining to give a recommendation or by ensuring any recommendation is accurate and not misleading in light of known facts.