506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986)
Revlon, Inc. v.
What fiduciary duties are owed by a corporation's board of directors when the sale of the company becomes inevitable?
When the sale of a corporation becomes inevitable, the directors must act as auctioneers to obtain the best price for shareholders; they owe the duty to maximize short-term shareholder value.
The Delaware Supreme Court held that once a sale of the corporation becomes inevitable, directors' fiduciary duties shift from preserving the corporate entity as an ongoing concern to maximizing the company’s value at a sale for the shareholders' benefit. The court criticized Revlon's board for failing to act in this capacity and enjoined aspects of the Forstmann deal.
Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews established a clear doctrine concerning director duties in change-of-control scenarios, effectively guiding future boards on their obligations when facing similar takeovers. It underscores the heightened scrutiny applied by courts on directors' actions when restructuring or selling a company. For students, this case is integral in recognizing how strategic decisions in corporate governance are bound by fiduciary responsibilities. This case also clearly demarcates the point at which directors must pivot from defending against a takeover to ensuring the shareholders receive the best financial outcome. Understanding this legal precedent helps future corporate lawyers evaluate and advise on director conduct effectively in takeover situations.