Scott Nelson, a Florida resident, responded to U.S.-based recruitment by the King Faisal Specialist Hospital and Research Center, a Saudi government-owned hospital (an instrumentality of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia). He interviewed and signed an employment contract in the United States and then relocated to Saudi Arabia to work as a monitoring systems engineer. While employed there, Nelson discovered and reported safety violations relating to the hospital's oxygen and nitrous oxide lines. After he attempted to notify Saudi authorities, Saudi police arrested him. He was detained for several weeks, allegedly beaten, tortured, and forced to sign a false statement. Upon his release, Nelson and his wife returned to the United States and filed suit in federal court against the Kingdom, the hospital, and related entities, alleging negligence (including failure to warn and provide a safe workplace), false imprisonment, assault and battery, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The district court dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under the FSIA. The court of appeals allowed the suit to proceed under the commercial-activity exception. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Whether the FSIA's commercial-activity exception, or the noncommercial tort exception, permits a U.S. court to exercise jurisdiction over Saudi Arabia and its hospital for claims arising from the plaintiff's arrest, imprisonment, and torture in Saudi Arabia, where the employment was recruited and contracted in the United States.
Under the FSIA, foreign states are presumptively immune from suit in U.S. courts (28 U.S.C. § 1604) unless a statutory exception applies. The commercial-activity exception withdraws immunity in any case "in which the action is based upon" a foreign state's commercial activity carried on in the United States, an act performed in the United States in connection with commercial activity elsewhere, or an act outside the United States in connection with commercial activity elsewhere that causes a direct effect in the United States (28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2)). "Commercial activity" is determined by the nature of the act, not its purpose and refers to conduct a private party can engage in (28 U.S.C. § 1603(d)); the key phrase "based upon" looks to those elements of the plaintiff's claim that, if proven, would entitle the plaintiff to relief—the gravamen of the suit. The noncommercial tort exception, 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5), permits suits for certain torts causing personal injury or death "occurring in the United States," subject to enumerated exclusions; it does not reach torts occurring in a foreign country.
No. The action is not "based upon" commercial activity within the meaning of § 1605(a)(2), but upon sovereign acts—arrest, imprisonment, and related police conduct. The noncommercial tort exception, § 1605(a)(5), does not apply because the alleged torts occurred in Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia and its instrumentality are therefore immune, and the case must be dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
The Court began by reiterating that the FSIA provides the sole basis for obtaining jurisdiction over a foreign state in U.S. courts and that immunity is the default. Turning to § 1605(a)(2), the Court focused on the statutory phrase "based upon." It explained that this requires courts to identify the conduct that constitutes the gravamen of the complaint—the elements that, if proved, would entitle the plaintiff to relief. Although the employment recruitment and contracting occurred in the United States and are commercial in nature, the Nelsons' claims sounded in wrongful arrest, imprisonment, and torture. Those injuries arose from exercises of police power—quintessentially sovereign acts that private entities cannot lawfully perform. Because the elements of the tort claims depended on these sovereign acts, not on the commercial recruitment or employment arrangements, the suit was not "based upon" commercial activity carried on in the United States. The Court also rejected reliance on the other prongs of § 1605(a)(2). Even if one characterized the Saudi conduct as connected to the hospital's commercial operations, the critical acts alleged—arrest and detention—were sovereign, not commercial. Thus the "in connection with" language could not convert inherently sovereign police conduct into commercial activity. Likewise, any downstream effects in the United States could not salvage jurisdiction because the action must still be "based upon" an act in connection with commercial activity; again, the gravamen was sovereign police conduct abroad. As to § 1605(a)(5), the noncommercial tort exception expressly requires that the personal injury or death occur in the United States. The alleged injuries, arrests, and abuse occurred entirely in Saudi Arabia, so the exception did not apply. With neither exception available, the FSIA required dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
Nelson is the Supreme Court's leading articulation of how to identify the gravamen of a FSIA claim. It narrows the commercial-activity exception by preventing plaintiffs from bootstrapping sovereign misconduct abroad to antecedent or collateral commercial dealings in the United States. The decision draws a firm line between commercial conduct a private party could undertake (recruitment, contracting, employment) and sovereign acts (police powers such as arrest and detention). For law students, Nelson is essential for FSIA exam questions and practice because it provides the analytical approach later reaffirmed in cases like OBB Personenverkehr AG v. Sachs. It also signals the practical difficulty of obtaining U.S. forum jurisdiction over human-rights-related injuries inflicted by foreign sovereigns abroad, underscoring the importance of careful pleading and the limits of U.S. courts' reach.
Saudi Arabia v. Nelson sets a durable blueprint for FSIA analysis: identify the legal elements that entitle the plaintiff to relief and ask whether those core acts are commercial or sovereign. Because the Nelsons' claims arose from arrest and detention—sovereign police powers—the FSIA's commercial-activity exception did not apply, and the foreign-country location of the torts foreclosed the noncommercial tort exception.