The plaintiff was a son and beneficiary under his late father's will. The will left the son a substantial inheritance subject to an express condition precedent: he must marry within seven years of the testator's death to a Jewish woman whose both parents were Jewish. If the son failed to satisfy the condition, his share would lapse and pass over, inter alia, to the State of Israel. The Union National Bank, named as executor, stood ready to administer the estate per the will. The son filed an action seeking to invalidate the condition as an unconstitutional infringement on his fundamental right to marry and as void against public policy as an unreasonable restraint on marriage. He argued that enforcement by a probate court constituted impermissible state action, analogizing to cases invalidating racial covenants and governmental marriage restrictions. The executor defended the clause as a permissible, reasonable partial restraint that did not prohibit marriage, did not encourage divorce, and was an allowable expression of the testator's freedom to dispose of property.
Is a testamentary condition that a beneficiary must, within a specified period, marry a person of a particular religion (a Jewish woman whose parents are both Jewish) an unenforceable restraint on marriage or unconstitutional state action, or is it a valid, reasonable partial restraint consistent with public policy and testamentary freedom?
A testator may impose reasonable partial restraints on marriage in donative instruments, and such conditions are valid and enforceable if they do not constitute a total or unduly burdensome restraint and do not encourage divorce. Courts evaluate reasonableness by considering the scope of the limitation, the time allowed, and the availability of a meaningful pool of potential spouses. Enforcement of a private testamentary condition, which does not command or forbid marriage but conditions receipt of a gift, does not amount to unconstitutional state action; the Constitution restricts governmental, not private, choices about the disposition of property.
The marriage condition was a reasonable partial restraint and therefore valid and enforceable. It did not violate public policy, did not impermissibly burden the fundamental right to marry, and did not constitute unconstitutional state action. The son's challenge was denied, and the will provision was upheld.
The court began with the strong policy of honoring testamentary intent, noting that the right to take by will is a creature of law that permits donors substantial latitude to attach conditions to gifts. It distinguished between total restraints, which are void, and partial restraints, which may be valid if reasonable. The condition here was partial because it did not forbid marriage but limited the class of permissible spouses and provided a substantial seven-year window to comply. The limitation to a Jewish spouse with two Jewish parents narrowed the eligible pool, but the court concluded that the class was still sufficiently large so as not to make marriage unreasonably difficult. The condition also did not encourage divorce; it addressed initial marriage choices and did not require dissolving any existing marriage. On the constitutional arguments, the court rejected the claim that enforcing the will amounted to state action restricting a fundamental right. Unlike cases such as Loving v. Virginia, where the state directly constrained marriage, here the state merely recognized a private donor's condition for receiving a gift; the son remained free to marry anyone, though not necessarily to inherit under his father's plan. The court distinguished Shelley v. Kraemer, reasoning that judicial enforcement of a private will provision that determines the disposition of a donor's own property is not equivalent to state-enforced discrimination that restricts ownership rights of third parties. Because there was no governmental prohibition of marriage, no suspect classification imposed by law, and no encouragement of divorce, the court found no constitutional infirmity. Finally, the court surveyed analogous authority approving reasonable faith-based marriage restrictions and reemphasized that public policy does not forbid a donor from preferring marriage within a faith, so long as the restriction is not absolute or practically insurmountable. The gift-over provision if the condition failed further evidenced the testator's clear intent and ensured orderly administration without requiring the court to rewrite the will.
Shapira is a leading case on partial restraints on marriage in wills. It teaches that courts will generally honor donor intent when conditions are framed as reasonable, time-limited, and non-divorce-inducing. The case is also a primer on the limits of constitutional arguments in private donative transfers: it clarifies that the right to marry does not guarantee a right to receive a particular inheritance. For students, Shapira provides a structured approach to analyzing restraint-on-marriage clauses, spotting state-action pitfalls, distinguishing religion- versus race-based restrictions, and understanding how to draft enforceable conditions and gift-overs.
Shapira v. Union National Bank affirms robust testamentary freedom while cabining it with a reasonableness test for partial restraints on marriage. The opinion underscores that private donors may shape the disposition of their estates to advance personal or religious values, so long as they do not effectively bar marriage or induce divorce.