Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948)
Shelley v. Kraemer is a foundational Supreme Court decision at the intersection of constitutional law and property law.
Does judicial enforcement by state courts of racially restrictive covenants constitute state action that violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?
Private parties may voluntarily adhere to racially restrictive covenants without implicating the Fourteenth Amendment, which restricts only state action. However, when state courts enforce such private agreements, that enforcement constitutes state action attributable to the state. State action that effectuates racial discrimination in the acquisition, use, and enjoyment of property violates the Equal Protection Clause. Consequently, state courts may not enforce racially restrictive covenants.
Yes. Judicial enforcement of racially restrictive covenants is state action, and enforcing such covenants to deny property rights based on race violates the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. The Court reversed the state court judgments enforcing the covenants.
Shelley v. Kraemer is a cornerstone of the state action doctrine and a critical milestone in civil rights law. It clarifies that courts themselves are state actors and that their enforcement of private discrimination triggers constitutional scrutiny. The decision did not ban the mere existence of discriminatory covenants but rendered them legally toothless by forbidding state enforcement. For law students, Shelley illustrates how constitutional principles shape private law remedies. It bridges property law (real covenants and equitable servitudes) and constitutional constraints on judicial enforcement, setting the stage for subsequent cases like Barrows v. Jackson (prohibiting damages actions to enforce such covenants) and for legislative developments such as the Fair Housing Act of 1968. Shelley's state action analysis remains a touchstone for evaluating when private conduct becomes constitutionally attributable to the state.