518 F.2d 751 (2d Cir. 1975)
Silver Chrysler Plymouth v. Chrysler Motors is a cornerstone Second Circuit decision refining when a lawyer must be disqualified because of prior affiliation with the adversary's law firm.
Does a lawyer's prior service as a junior associate at the adversary's long-time law firm, without evidence that the lawyer worked on substantially related matters or obtained relevant client confidences, require disqualification of the lawyer (and by imputation the lawyer's new firm) from representing a party against that former client?
Under Canon 4 and the substantial-relationship test, disqualification is warranted where the subject matter of the present representation is substantially related to the subject matter of a former representation, such that it can reasonably be inferred the attorney received client confidences that could be used to the former client's detriment. When the same attorney previously represented the adversary in a substantially related matter, a presumption arises that confidences were disclosed. However, when the lawyer was only a junior associate at a firm that represented the adversary, the presumption that the lawyer had access to the adversary's confidences is rebuttable with competent proof that the associate neither worked on substantially related matters nor had access to relevant confidences. The moving party bears the burden to show a substantial relationship or actual exposure to confidences; disqualification, a drastic remedy affecting client choice of counsel and lawyer mobility, should not be granted on mere speculation or solely on the appearance of impropriety.
Reversing the district court's order, the Second Circuit held that the attorney and his new firm should not be disqualified. The mere fact that the attorney had previously been a junior associate at the adversary's long-time law firm did not, absent a substantial relationship or evidence of access to relevant confidences, warrant disqualification.
Silver Chrysler is frequently cited for refining disqualification law in lateral-move contexts. It squarely places the burden on the moving party, ties disqualification to the substantial-relationship test, limits the overuse of Canon 9, and recognizes a rebuttable presumption of shared confidences for junior associates. For law students, it illustrates how courts balance confidentiality, client choice of counsel, and lawyer mobility, and how evidentiary showings (affidavits, specific work histories, compartmentalization) determine outcomes in disqualification motions.