What are the facts?
Employees of Swift & Co., a meatpacking company, served as auxiliary firefighters at the company's plant. In addition to their regular duties, they were required to remain on or near the premises during certain off-hours to respond to alarms, participate in drills, and be available for emergencies. While on this standby status, they could engage in limited personal activities—sleeping, eating, reading, playing cards—but they were subject to employer control, had to remain within close range of the plant, and faced interruptions from calls and drills. Swift compensated them for time spent responding to alarms and for certain drills but did not pay for the intervening waiting time. The employees sought overtime compensation for this standby time under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). The Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division had issued interpretive guidance suggesting that waiting time can be compensable when employees are "engaged to wait," depending on the degree of constraint and employer control. The lower courts ruled for Swift, treating the waiting time as noncompensable. The Supreme Court granted review to determine both the compensability of the waiting time and the weight courts should give to the Administrator's interpretive rulings.
What is the legal issue?
Are employees' standby or waiting hours compensable as "work" under the FLSA, and to what extent should courts defer to the Wage and Hour Administrator's interpretive guidance on that question?
What rule applies?
Agency interpretations lacking the force of law are not controlling, but they are entitled to respect proportional to their persuasive power. The weight a court gives an agency's view depends on the thoroughness of its consideration, the validity and logic of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and the agency's expertise and specialized experience. Under the FLSA, whether waiting or standby time is compensable is a fact-intensive inquiry. The central question is whether the time is spent predominantly for the employer's benefit. Factors include the degree of employer control, the geographic and temporal restrictions on the employee, the frequency and unpredictability of calls, and the extent to which the time can be effectively used for the employee's own purposes.
What did the court hold?
Agency interpretive rulings under the FLSA are entitled to respect to the extent they have the power to persuade but are not binding on courts. Whether the firefighters' standby time is compensable is not a categorical matter; it is a question for the trier of fact based on the totality of circumstances. The judgment for the employer was reversed and the case remanded for application of these principles.
What is the reasoning?
The Court, per Justice Jackson, rejected a bright-line rule that would either automatically include or exclude waiting time from hours worked. The meaning of "work" in the FLSA must be applied pragmatically, with attention to practical realities rather than formal labels. When employees' freedom is substantially constrained by employer requirements—such that the time is spent predominantly for the employer's benefit—standby time can qualify as compensable work. Conversely, if the restrictions are minimal and the employees can effectively use the time for their own purposes, compensation may be unwarranted. Turning to the role of agency views, the Court emphasized that the Wage and Hour Administrator's interpretations are not controlling as a matter of law because they were not promulgated through binding procedures. Nevertheless, they represent an informed judgment grounded in the agency's experience enforcing the FLSA. Courts should therefore treat them as persuasive authority, assigning weight based on the thoroughness of the agency's analysis, the soundness of its reasoning, consistency over time, and the fit between the guidance and the statutory context. Applying these principles, the Court concluded that the record contained evidence supporting the employees' position and that a fact-finder should determine whether the constraints on their time rendered it compensable under the FLSA.
Why is this case significant?
Skidmore establishes the baseline, flexible approach to agency deference—often called persuasive or respect-based deference—that continues to guide courts when agencies interpret statutes through informal means (e.g., opinion letters, enforcement manuals, interpretive rules, guidance documents). It contrasts with Chevron's later, more deferential framework for interpretations issued with the force of law, and it remains central after United States v. Mead clarified that many agency actions receive only Skidmore respect. For labor and employment law, Skidmore also anchors the doctrine that compensability of waiting time hinges on the totality of circumstances, influencing numerous FLSA cases about on-call, standby, and sleep time. For law students, the case teaches how courts balance agency expertise with judicial judgment and how statutory terms are applied through context-sensitive, fact-based analysis.
How does Skidmore deference differ from Chevron deference?
Skidmore deference is persuasive, not binding. Courts give weight to agency interpretations based on their thoroughness, logic, consistency, and expertise. Chevron deference, by contrast, applies when Congress has delegated authority to the agency to make rules with the force of law and the interpretation arises from exercising that authority; if the statute is ambiguous and the interpretation is reasonable, courts must defer. Many agency interpretations—especially informal ones—receive only Skidmore respect.
What factors determine whether waiting time is compensable under the FLSA?
Courts assess whether the time is spent predominantly for the employer's benefit, considering the degree of employer control, geographic and temporal restrictions, the frequency and unpredictability of calls, required response times, and whether the employee can meaningfully use the time for personal pursuits. The analysis is context-specific; no single factor is dispositive.
What agency materials can receive Skidmore weight?
Interpretive rules, guidance documents, opinion letters, enforcement manuals, policy statements, and litigating positions can receive Skidmore respect. The precise weight varies with the material's thoroughness, reasoning, consistency, and the agency's expertise. Formality is not required for Skidmore, but more care and consistency typically yield greater persuasive force.
How does Skidmore relate to later cases like Mead and Kisor?
United States v. Mead clarified that when agency action lacks the force of law, courts generally apply Skidmore, not Chevron. Kisor v. Wilkie refined deference to an agency's interpretation of its own regulations (Auer/Kisor) and, even there, emphasized rigorous thresholds and consideration of the interpretation's persuasive quality—echoing Skidmore's focus on reasoned judgment and consistency.
Did the Supreme Court decide whether the firefighters' time was compensable?
No. The Court expressly rejected a categorical approach and held the question is fact-intensive. It reversed and remanded so the trier of fact could determine, under the totality of circumstances and informed by the Administrator's persuasive guidance, whether the employees' standby time was compensable.