The City of Jackson, Mississippi, adopted a pay plan in 1999 to improve recruitment and retention of police officers and dispatchers. The plan provided across-the-board salary increases but awarded proportionally larger raises to officers with fewer than five years of service, whose pay lagged behind comparable regional rates. Because senior officers tended to be older, the plan resulted in smaller percentage increases for many employees aged 40 and over, even though those employees also received raises. A group of older officers challenged the plan under the ADEA, alleging both disparate treatment (intentional age discrimination) and disparate impact (a facially neutral policy that disproportionately harmed older workers). The district court granted summary judgment for the City on both theories. The Fifth Circuit affirmed and further held that disparate-impact claims are not cognizable under the ADEA. The officers sought Supreme Court review limited to the disparate-impact issue.
Does the ADEA permit disparate-impact claims, and if so, did the plaintiffs establish a prima facie disparate-impact case that is not defeated by the ADEA's "reasonable factors other than age" (RFOA) defense?
The ADEA's prohibition on discrimination in terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because of age, 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(2), authorizes disparate-impact claims, consistent with the similar language in Title VII as interpreted in Griggs v. Duke Power Co. However, ADEA disparate-impact liability is narrower than under Title VII because the ADEA expressly provides a defense where the challenged practice is based on reasonable factors other than age (RFOA), 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1). Plaintiffs must identify a specific employment practice causing the statistical disparity, and the employer avoids liability if it shows the practice was based on reasonable non-age factors. The 1991 Civil Rights Act's amendments that modified disparate-impact law under Title VII do not apply to the ADEA, leaving in place the Wards Cove requirements (including the need to identify a specific practice) in the ADEA context.
Yes. The ADEA authorizes disparate-impact claims. Nevertheless, the plaintiffs failed to identify a specific employment practice causing the alleged disparity, and, in any event, the City's pay plan was based on reasonable factors other than age; summary judgment for the City was affirmed.
Text and precedent. The Court observed that § 623(a)(2) of the ADEA tracks Title VII's § 703(a)(2) language previously interpreted in Griggs to permit disparate-impact claims, indicating Congress intended similar coverage. At the same time, the ADEA contains an explicit RFOA provision that Title VII lacks, signaling Congress's intent to cabin ADEA disparate-impact liability more tightly than Title VII's. Interaction with Wards Cove and the 1991 Act. The Court explained that Wards Cove imposed certain constraints on disparate-impact claims, including the requirement that plaintiffs isolate and identify a specific employment practice responsible for observed disparities. Although Congress later amended Title VII in the Civil Rights Act of 1991 to alter aspects of Wards Cove, it did not make parallel changes to the ADEA. Consequently, Wards Cove's specific-practice requirement and its more employer-friendly approach continue to inform ADEA disparate-impact analysis. Application. The plaintiffs did not pinpoint a specific practice; they challenged the pay plan globally and argued that larger percentage raises for junior officers disproportionately harmed older workers. Even if a specific practice were identified, the City's rationale—raising starting salaries to make junior positions competitive and address retention and recruitment—constituted a reasonable factor other than age. The plan was not based on age per se, and older officers also received raises. Thus, the City satisfied the RFOA defense, defeating liability. Because the Court's review was limited to the disparate-impact question, the disparate-treatment claims resolved adversely to plaintiffs in the lower courts were not before the Court. Concurrences and dissents. A concurrence emphasized deference to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's view that the ADEA permits disparate impact. A separate opinion argued that the ADEA should not recognize disparate-impact claims or that, at a minimum, the plaintiffs' showing was inadequate. The controlling opinion, however, definitively recognized ADEA disparate-impact claims while affirming judgment for the City.
Smith definitively recognizes disparate-impact liability under the ADEA, aligning it with Title VII's structure but preserving important differences. It clarifies that ADEA disparate-impact claims are narrower because of the statute's RFOA defense and because the 1991 Civil Rights Act's disparate-impact amendments to Title VII do not apply to the ADEA. Practically, the decision raises the bar for plaintiffs: they must identify a discrete policy or practice causing a statistical disparity and overcome an employer's showing that the policy was reasonably based on non-age considerations such as cost, market competitiveness, or experience. For law students, Smith is essential to understanding how textual differences between statutes and legislative amendments shape the contours of discrimination law.
Smith v. City of Jackson strikes a careful balance: it opens the door to disparate-impact claims under the ADEA, ensuring older workers are not left without a remedy when facially neutral policies disproportionately burden them, yet it simultaneously cabins that cause of action by honoring Congress's explicit RFOA defense and by importing Wards Cove's requirement to identify a specific practice. The Court thus aligned the ADEA with Title VII's interpretive history while preserving critical statutory differences.