431 U.S. 816 (1977)
Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality and Reform sits at the crossroads of constitutional due process and child welfare administration.
Do the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and any liberty interest of foster parents or foster children require a pre-removal, adversary evidentiary hearing before the State may remove a foster child from a foster home under New York's foster care regulations?
To trigger procedural due process protections, a claimant must identify a protected liberty or property interest. Liberty interests may arise directly from the Constitution—especially where rooted in history and tradition, such as the natural family—or be created and defined by state law and contractual arrangements. When a protected interest is implicated, the sufficiency of procedures is assessed under the Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test, which weighs (1) the private interest affected, (2) the risk of erroneous deprivation under existing procedures and the probable value of additional safeguards, and (3) the government's interests, including fiscal and administrative burdens and, here, the child's welfare and the State's parens patriae responsibilities. The Constitution does not require a uniform, adversary, pre-deprivation hearing in all contexts; the process due varies with the nature of the interest and the circumstances.
Assuming without deciding that foster parents and foster children possess some protectable liberty interest in the foster family relationship, New York's procedures—notice and an informal conference prior to removal when feasible, emergency removal authority when necessary, and prompt post-removal administrative and judicial review—satisfy due process. The Constitution does not require an adversary, evidentiary hearing before removal in this context. The district court's injunction was therefore improper.
Smith is a touchstone for understanding state-created liberty interests, the limits of constitutional protection for foster family relationships, and how Mathews v. Eldridge balancing operates in the sensitive arena of child welfare. It teaches that not all intimate or family-like relationships receive the same constitutional protection as biological or adoptive parenthood, and that the Due Process Clause calibrates procedures to context, particularly where the child's best interests and the State's protective responsibilities are paramount. The case also informs later decisions—such as Santosky v. Kramer—by clarifying that heightened procedures are most appropriate when the State seeks to terminate fundamental, traditional family rights, whereas more flexible procedures may suffice for state-created, temporary arrangements like foster care.