A consortium of Chicago-area municipalities, the Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County (SWANCC), sought to develop a "balefill" solid-waste disposal site on a 533-acre parcel in northern Illinois formerly used as a sand and gravel pit. Excavation had left a network of permanent and seasonal ponds totaling roughly 17 acres scattered across the site. Because construction would require filling these ponds, SWANCC contacted the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers about the need for a Clean Water Act § 404 permit, which authorizes the discharge of dredged or fill material into "navigable waters," defined by the CWA as "waters of the United States," 33 U.S.C. §§ 1344, 1362(7). The Corps initially indicated it lacked jurisdiction because the ponds were isolated and not adjacent to navigable waters. After learning that the site provided habitat for over 100 species of migratory birds, however, the Corps asserted jurisdiction under its so-called Migratory Bird Rule, a 1986 policy stating that § 404 extends to isolated, intrastate waters used as habitat by migratory birds that cross state lines. The Corps then denied SWANCC's permit application based on environmental impacts and public-interest factors. SWANCC filed suit, arguing that the Corps lacked statutory authority over the isolated ponds. The district court upheld the Corps' jurisdiction and the Seventh Circuit affirmed, reasoning that use by migratory birds had a sufficient connection to interstate commerce. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Does the Clean Water Act's definition of "navigable waters" as "waters of the United States" authorize the Army Corps of Engineers to assert § 404 jurisdiction over isolated, non-navigable, intrastate ponds based solely on their use by migratory birds (the Migratory Bird Rule)?
The Clean Water Act does not extend § 404 jurisdiction to isolated, non-navigable, intrastate waters based solely on their use by migratory birds. Absent a clear statement from Congress, courts will not construe the CWA to intrude into traditional state authority over land and water use. Agency interpretations that would significantly alter the federal-state balance or raise serious constitutional questions are not entitled to deference and will be rejected if not supported by the statute's text and structure.
No. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Corps lacked authority under the CWA to regulate isolated, non-navigable, intrastate ponds based solely on the Migratory Bird Rule.
Text and structure: The Court emphasized that while the CWA defines "navigable waters" as "waters of the United States," the term "navigable" retains some limiting function. In United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes (1985), the Court had upheld regulation of wetlands adjacent to navigable waters because of their integral ecological connection to those waters. Here, by contrast, the ponds were isolated and lacked a significant nexus to navigable waters. The statute's text and structure did not support the Corps' attempt to extend § 404 to such waters solely due to their use by migratory birds. Chevron and deference: The Court declined to defer to the Corps under Chevron. While agencies often have leeway to interpret ambiguous terms, the Corps' interpretation stretched the phrase "waters of the United States" beyond what the statute could bear and would substantially alter the balance of federal and state power without a clear statement from Congress. The Court also noted the CWA's policy statement in § 101(b), recognizing the primary responsibilities of States for land and water resource use, reinforcing a cautious approach to expansive federal claims of jurisdiction. Federalism clear statement and avoidance: Accepting the Migratory Bird Rule would push the CWA to the outer limits of Congress's Commerce Clause power. Citing federalism canons (e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft) and constitutional avoidance, the Court construed the statute to avoid these constitutional questions in the absence of an unmistakably clear authorization from Congress. The legislative history cited by the Corps did not supply such a clear statement. The Court thus confined § 404 jurisdiction to waters with a meaningful connection to navigable waters and rejected the Corps' reliance on the presence of migratory birds as an adequate basis for jurisdiction. Distinguishing precedent: Riverside Bayview turned on adjacency and the ecological connection of wetlands to navigable waters. SWANCC's ponds were non-adjacent, isolated, and entirely intrastate. The Court found "nothing approaching a clear statement" that Congress intended § 404 to reach abandoned sand and gravel pits with only incidental use by migratory birds. Therefore, Riverside Bayview did not support the Corps' position.
SWANCC is a cornerstone WOTUS case limiting federal reach under the Clean Water Act. It invalidated the Migratory Bird Rule and underscored that the term "navigable" imposes real constraints on federal jurisdiction. The case is central to law students for three reasons: (1) statutory interpretation and canons—textual limits, federalism clear-statement, and constitutional avoidance; (2) administrative law—constraints on Chevron deference when an agency interpretation would significantly intrude on state authority without clear congressional authorization; and (3) environmental federalism—preserving primary state control over isolated waters and land-use decisions. SWANCC paved the way for later disputes in Rapanos v. United States (2006) and more recent WOTUS rulemakings and decisions, where the Court continued to grapple with the scope of federal water protections.
SWANCC narrowed the reach of the Clean Water Act by rejecting a broad agency interpretation that would have brought isolated ponds within federal jurisdiction merely because migratory birds used them. The Court anchored its decision in statutory text, distinguished earlier precedent focused on adjacency, and enforced federalism limits that require Congress to speak clearly before significantly intruding on traditional state domains of land and water use.