In 1981, Curtis Campbell, insured by State Farm with $50,000 policy limits, attempted to pass several cars on a two-lane Utah highway, causing a collision that killed one driver (Ospital) and permanently injured another (Slusher). The estates and victims offered to settle their claims against Campbell within the policy limits; State Farm declined, assured Campbell he bore no liability, and took the case to trial. A jury found Campbell liable and returned a judgment of approximately $185,849—well in excess of Campbell's coverage. State Farm initially refused to cover the excess and advised Campbell to post a bond and consider selling his home, leading to severe financial and emotional strain on the Campbells. After further proceedings, State Farm ultimately paid the entire judgment, including the excess. The Campbells then sued State Farm for bad faith, fraud, and intentional infliction of emotional distress, alleging that State Farm employed a nationwide claims-handling program designed to cap payouts and coerce low settlements. At trial, the plaintiffs introduced extensive evidence of State Farm's out-of-state and allegedly dissimilar practices. The jury awarded $2.6 million in compensatory damages and $145 million in punitive damages. The trial court remitted the awards to $1 million compensatory and $25 million punitive. On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court reinstated the $145 million punitive damages award (while leaving $1 million compensatory), heavily emphasizing State Farm's nationwide conduct and the need for deterrence. The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Does a $145 million punitive damages award—145 times the $1 million compensatory damages—based in significant part on out-of-state and dissimilar conduct, violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?
Under the Due Process Clause, punitive damages must be reasonable and proportionate to the actual harm suffered and to the state's legitimate interests in punishment and deterrence. Courts evaluate punitive awards using the BMW v. Gore guideposts: (1) the degree of reprehensibility (the most important factor), assessed by considering whether the harm was physical or economic, whether the conduct showed indifference to the health or safety of others, whether the target was financially vulnerable, whether the conduct was repeated or isolated, and whether the harm resulted from intentional malice, trickery, or deceit; (2) the ratio between punitive and compensatory damages, with the Court cautioning that, in practice, few awards exceeding a single-digit ratio will satisfy due process and that a 1:1 ratio may be near the constitutional line when compensatory damages are substantial; and (3) the disparity between the punitive award and civil penalties authorized or imposed in comparable cases. A state may not use punitive damages to punish a defendant for lawful out-of-state conduct or for harms to nonparties, and a defendant's wealth cannot justify an otherwise unconstitutional award.
Yes. The $145 million punitive damages award violated the Due Process Clause. The Court reversed the Utah Supreme Court and remanded for proceedings consistent with its opinion.
The Court applied the BMW v. Gore guideposts and found the award constitutionally excessive. First, on reprehensibility, while State Farm's handling of Campbell's claim involved deception and disregard of the insureds' financial vulnerability, the harm was primarily economic, not physical; there was no threat to health or safety; and much of the evidence concerned dissimilar, out-of-state conduct and harm to nonparties. Due process does not permit a state to punish a defendant for out-of-state conduct that may be lawful where it occurred, or to impose punishment for injuries to individuals who are not parties to the case. Utah's approach risked duplicative, nationwide punishment untethered to the plaintiffs' own injury. Second, the 145:1 punitive-to-compensatory ratio was grossly disproportionate. Although the Court declined to impose a rigid bright-line rule, it reiterated that single-digit multipliers are the practical outer bounds of constitutional reasonableness in most cases. Where compensatory damages are substantial—as here at $1 million—even a 1:1 ratio may reach the line of constitutional impropriety. The Court emphasized that punitive damages serve to punish and deter, not to mete out arbitrary, outsized penalties detached from the actual harm adjudicated. Third, the punitive award dwarfed comparable statutory sanctions. The civil and criminal penalties available under Utah law for similar misconduct were dramatically lower than $145 million, reinforcing the conclusion that the award was excessive. The Court also rejected reliance on State Farm's wealth to sustain the award; wealth cannot convert an otherwise unconstitutional punitive judgment into a permissible one.
State Farm cabins jury discretion and provides operational guidance to courts reviewing punitive damages. It refines BMW v. Gore by stressing that punitive damages ordinarily should not exceed single-digit ratios to compensatory damages, especially where compensatory damages are substantial, and by clarifying that evidence of out-of-state, dissimilar conduct, or harm to nonparties cannot justify inflating a punitive award. For students, the case is a cornerstone in analyzing punitive damages: it supplies the controlling framework for excessiveness challenges, sets evidentiary boundaries for proving reprehensibility, and is frequently tested in Torts and Remedies to evaluate ratios, comparable penalties, and the scope of permissible punishment.
State Farm v. Campbell constitutionalizes meaningful limits on punitive damages by insisting that punishment be tethered to the plaintiff's harm, proportionate to compensatory damages, and comparable to statutory sanctions. It curbs the risk of arbitrary and overbroad punishment—especially where juries are invited to condemn a defendant's nationwide conduct or to redress injuries suffered by strangers to the litigation.