State v. Ragland, 105 N.J. 189, 519 A.2d 1361 (N.J. 1987)
State v. Ragland is a leading New Jersey Supreme Court decision on the scope of a criminal jury's role and the controversial concept of jury nullification.
Does a criminal defendant have a right to a jury instruction acknowledging or permitting jury nullification, and is it error for a trial judge to instruct that jurors "must" convict if the State has proven every element beyond a reasonable doubt?
While juries possess the de facto power to acquit contrary to the evidence and the law, they have no legal right to disregard the law or to be instructed that they may do so. A trial court may properly instruct that if the State proves each element of an offense beyond a reasonable doubt, the jury has a duty—i.e., must—return a guilty verdict; conversely, if an element is not proven, the jury must acquit. Courts should not encourage or inform juries about the power to nullify.
No. A defendant is not entitled to a jury nullification instruction, and it is not error for a trial judge to instruct jurors that they must convict if the State proves each element beyond a reasonable doubt. The Appellate Division's reversal based on the "must convict" charge was improper, and the convictions were reinstated.
Ragland is the leading New Jersey authority on jury nullification and jury instructions, widely cited for the proposition that while juries have the practical power to nullify, no legal right to do so exists. It affirms the propriety of "must convict/must acquit" instructions framed by the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard and reinforces the judiciary's role in declaring the law. For law students, Ragland anchors debates about the separation of functions in criminal trials, the ethical limits of advocacy concerning nullification, and the policy tensions between jury independence and the rule of law.