156 U.S. 1 (1895)
United States v. E.C.
Does the acquisition of several sugar refineries by the American Sugar Refining Company, which controls most of the sugar refining industry, constitute a violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act by improperly restraining interstate commerce?
The distinction between manufacturing and commerce is critical; while Congress has the power to regulate interstate commerce under the Commerce Clause, manufacturing is considered a local activity subject to state regulation.
The Supreme Court held that the Sherman Act did not apply in this case because the manufacturing of sugar, although it affected commerce, was not itself commerce. Therefore, the control of manufacturing did not directly fall under congressional authority to regulate interstate commerce.
United States v. E.C. Knight Co. is highly significant for its considerable influence on antitrust jurisprudence and federal regulatory power. By narrowly construing the scope of the Sherman Act, the decision laid a foundation for future legal battles over the extent of federal intervention in economic affairs. The formalistic distinction drawn between manufacturing and commerce restricted the federal government's ability to intervene in monopolistic practices, prompting calls for legislative reform and eventual broader interpretations of the commerce clause in later decades.