560 F.2d 112 (2d Cir. 1977)
United States v. Jackson is a leading federal case on criminal attempt and the doctrine of impossibility, frequently taught alongside classic common-law decisions to illustrate how modern courts handle sting operations and thwarted crimes.
Is impossibility a defense to an attempt charge for receiving stolen goods when the goods were not, in fact, stolen, but the defendants believed and acted as if they were?
Factual impossibility—where the intended substantive crime is impossible to complete because of some factual condition unknown to the defendant (e.g., the goods are not actually stolen)—is not a defense to attempt. A defendant is guilty of attempt if he acts with the requisite intent to commit the substantive offense and engages in conduct constituting a substantial step strongly corroborative of that criminal purpose. The critical inquiry is whether the defendant's conduct would be criminal if the circumstances were as he believed them to be.
No. The impossibility that the goods were not actually stolen does not bar attempt liability. The defendants' intent to receive stolen goods and their substantial steps toward that end suffice for an attempt conviction. The convictions were affirmed.
Jackson is a staple in the attempt/impossibility unit. It confirms the modern rule that factual impossibility is no defense and frames the correct analysis: would the conduct be criminal if the circumstances were as the actor believed? It also supplies the template for evaluating undercover stings: the government's creation of an impossible completion does not negate attempt liability where intent and substantial steps are present. For law students, Jackson clarifies the doctrinal move away from formalistic impossibility categories toward a focus on culpability and strong corroboration of the criminal purpose, harmonizing with the Model Penal Code's Section 5.01.