435 U.S. 519 (U.S. Supreme Court 1978)
Vermont Yankee is the canonical case on the limits of judicial power to superimpose procedural requirements on federal administrative agencies. Decided against a backdrop of the D.C.
May a reviewing court require an administrative agency engaged in informal rulemaking to employ additional procedural devices (e.g., discovery, cross-examination, or trial-type hearings) beyond those required by the APA, the agency's organic statute, or the Constitution?
Under the Administrative Procedure Act, Section 553 establishes the procedural framework for informal rulemaking (notice, opportunity for comment, and a concise general statement of basis and purpose). Reviewing courts may not impose additional procedural requirements not specified by the APA, the Constitution, or an agency's governing statute. Agencies remain free to adopt extra procedures voluntarily, and once adopted they must follow them (Accardi principle). Courts retain authority under APA §706 to set aside agency action that is arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law, but the remedy for an inadequate record or explanation is remand for further consideration—not judicially imposed procedural supplements.
No. The Supreme Court reversed the D.C. Circuit, holding that courts may not impose procedural requirements on agencies beyond those mandated by the APA, the Constitution, or applicable statutes. The NRC's choice to proceed via standard notice-and-comment procedures was lawful, and NEPA did not require the additional trial-type procedures the D.C. Circuit ordered.
Vermont Yankee is the lodestar limiting judicial invention of administrative procedures. It stands for the principle that courts cannot transform informal rulemaking into ad hoc "hybrid rulemaking" by ordering cross-examination, discovery, or other trial-type procedures absent statutory or constitutional command. The decision preserves agency discretion to structure rulemaking and clarifies that the APA sets both a floor and, in critical respects, a ceiling on procedural obligations. For students, the case is essential in framing administrative law analysis: (1) identify the source of any asserted procedural requirement (APA, organic statute, Constitution, or agency rule); (2) if no such source exists, Vermont Yankee likely bars judicial imposition; (3) deficiencies in reasoning or record support are addressed via arbitrary-and-capricious review and remand, not through judicially prescribed extra procedures. Vermont Yankee thus pairs with State Farm to distinguish procedural limits (Vermont Yankee) from robust substantive reasonableness review (State Farm).