The Wisconsin Examining Board of Physicians and Surgeons, chaired by Withrow, opened an investigation into Dr. Larkin, a licensed physician, for alleged unprofessional conduct in connection with procedures performed at a private clinic. Under Wisconsin law, the Board was authorized to investigate possible misconduct, conduct evidentiary hearings, and impose discipline including license suspension or revocation. After receiving complaints and conducting an investigative inquiry, the Board issued a notice scheduling a contested case hearing to determine whether Dr. Larkin's license should be suspended or revoked. The statutory scheme also permitted the Board, upon a finding of probable cause, to impose a temporary suspension pending the outcome of the full hearing in order to protect the public. Before the Board's adjudicative hearing occurred, Dr. Larkin filed suit in federal court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking to enjoin the Board from proceeding. He argued that due process forbids the same body that investigates alleged misconduct and makes preliminary determinations, such as probable cause, from then adjudicating the merits because the combination of investigative and adjudicative roles creates an unconstitutional risk of bias. A three-judge district court agreed and enjoined the Board from holding the hearing, concluding that the structure created an unacceptable probability of bias and that due process requires a separate, neutral adjudicator. The Board appealed directly to the Supreme Court.
Does the Due Process Clause prohibit an administrative agency from adjudicating a case after it has investigated the same matter and made preliminary findings, on the ground that combining investigative and adjudicative functions creates an unconstitutional risk of bias?
Absent a showing that, under a realistic appraisal of psychological tendencies and human weakness, the probability of actual bias on the part of the decisionmaker is too high to be constitutionally tolerable, the combination of investigative and adjudicative functions within a single administrative agency does not violate due process. There is a presumption of honesty and integrity in those serving as adjudicators; prior involvement in investigation or making preliminary determinations such as probable cause is not, standing alone, sufficient to disqualify an agency or its members.
No. The Supreme Court reversed the injunction, holding that the mere combination of investigative and adjudicative functions in an administrative agency does not, without more, violate the Due Process Clause. Larkin failed to demonstrate special facts establishing a constitutionally intolerable risk of bias.
The Court began by reaffirming the constitutional requirement of a fair trial in a fair tribunal. However, it emphasized that administrative bodies need not mirror the judicial model; the Constitution does not prohibit agencies from combining investigatory and adjudicative roles. American administrative practice has long vested agencies with mixed functions, and the Court has repeatedly upheld such arrangements. Citing cases like FTC v. Cement Institute, the Court noted that exposure to information in nonadversary investigative proceedings is not a basis for disqualification of agency members who later sit in adjudication. The three-judge district court erred by presuming that the Board's investigative role and any preliminary probable-cause determinations necessarily tainted its adjudicative capacity. The Supreme Court contrasted this case with precedents like Tumey v. Ohio and Ward v. Monroeville, which involved adjudicators with pecuniary or institutional interests, and In re Murchison, where a judge served as a one-man grand jury and then tried contempts arising from that very proceeding. Those cases involved either a direct financial stake or an accusatorial role so intimate and personal as to raise an intolerable risk of bias. By contrast, the Wisconsin Board's functions reflected the standard administrative model: receiving complaints, investigating, and then affording a contested hearing with procedural safeguards before imposing discipline. The Court articulated a controlling presumption of honesty and integrity among administrative adjudicators. To overcome that presumption, a challenger must show special facts demonstrating a probability of bias that is constitutionally intolerable. Mere prior exposure to evidence, or having formed and expressed a preliminary view (such as finding probable cause or initiating charges), is not enough. Judges routinely make preliminary determinations (for example, issuing warrants or presiding over bail hearings) and still may adjudicate the merits without violating due process; the same principle reasonably applies to agencies. The record did not reveal statements, conduct, or structural features indicating personal animus, financial interest, or other disqualifying bias among Board members. Accordingly, the injunction preventing the Board from conducting its hearing was improper. Finally, while Wisconsin law permitted temporary suspension upon a probable-cause finding to protect the public, the Court did not hold that such summary measures were unconstitutional. Instead, it focused on the structural bias claim and concluded that the Board could proceed with its adjudicative hearing, where Larkin would receive notice and an opportunity to be heard before any final license revocation.
Withrow sets the baseline rule for structural due process attacks on administrative adjudication: combining investigative and adjudicative functions is constitutionally permissible absent special facts showing an intolerably high risk of bias. The case provides a framework for evaluating impartiality claims against professional licensing boards, securities and competition agencies, and other regulators. It also helps students distinguish between routine agency practice (which is acceptable) and the kinds of interests or roles that require recusal or structural separation (pecuniary interests, personal embroilment, or serving as both accuser and judge in the same matter). In exams and practice, Withrow is often paired with Tumey, Ward, and Murchison to map the spectrum of due process impartiality.
Withrow v. Larkin entrenches the principle that administrative agencies may, consistent with due process, combine investigative and adjudicative functions. It anchors a presumption of honesty and integrity in agency adjudicators, requiring specific, compelling evidence to show an intolerable probability of bias before the Constitution demands structural separation or recusal.