Dissent in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
509 U.S. 579 (1993) (1993) · Supreme Court of the United States
Daubert replaced the longstanding Frye 'general acceptance' test with a more flexible, multi-factor framework for determining the admissibility of expert scientific testimony under Federal Rule of Evidence 702. The decision assigned trial judges a gatekeeping role to ensure that expert testimony is both relevant and reliable. It fundamentally reshaped the landscape of scientific evidence in federal courts.
What was the dissent in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.?
Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justice Stevens, concurred in part and dissented in part. He agreed that Frye was superseded but criticized the majority for going beyond the question presented and issuing abstract guidelines. He expressed concern that the majority's factors were vague and would prove difficult for trial judges to apply in practice.
Source: Read Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. on Google Scholar
Case Overview
Facts
Jason Daubert and Eric Schuller were born with serious birth defects. Their families sued Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, alleging that the mothers' ingestion of Bendectin, an anti-nausea drug, during pregnancy caused the defects. Merrell Dow moved for summary judgment, presenting an expert affidavit reviewing over 30 published studies finding no link between Bendectin and birth defects. The plaintiffs countered with eight experts who relied on in vitro studies, animal studies, and reanalysis of prior epidemiological data, none of which had been published or subjected to peer review.
Majority Holding
The Court held that the Federal Rules of Evidence, specifically Rule 702, superseded the Frye general acceptance test. Trial judges must serve as gatekeepers, ensuring that expert scientific testimony is both relevant and reliable. The Court articulated a flexible, non-exclusive list of factors for assessing reliability, including testability, peer review, error rate, and general acceptance.
Majority Reasoning
Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority, reasoned that the Federal Rules of Evidence did not incorporate a rigid 'general acceptance' standard. Rule 702, as drafted, requires only that testimony assist the trier of fact and be based on 'scientific knowledge,' which implies a grounding in the methods and procedures of science. The Court identified four non-exclusive factors: whether the theory or technique can be and has been tested; whether it has been subjected to peer review and publication; the known or potential error rate; and the degree of acceptance within the relevant scientific community. The gatekeeping role assigned to the trial judge is guided by Rule 104(a), which gives the court broad discretion in making preliminary determinations of admissibility. The standard is flexible and focuses on principles and methodology, not on the conclusions generated.
The Dissenting Opinion
Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justice Stevens, concurred in part and dissented in part. He agreed that Frye was superseded but criticized the majority for going beyond the question presented and issuing abstract guidelines. He expressed concern that the majority's factors were vague and would prove difficult for trial judges to apply in practice.
Key Quotes
“The trial judge must ensure that any and all scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable.”
“The inquiry envisioned by Rule 702 is, we emphasize, a flexible one. Its overarching subject is the scientific validity -- and thus the evidentiary relevance and reliability -- of the principles that underlie a proposed submission.”
“Vigorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence.”
Impact and Legacy
Daubert became the controlling standard for expert testimony in all federal courts and was subsequently adopted by a majority of state courts. The decision expanded judicial gatekeeping responsibilities and led to extensive satellite litigation over the admissibility of expert testimony. Congress codified and strengthened the Daubert framework through the 2000 amendment to Rule 702.
Exam Relevance
Daubert is one of the most tested Evidence cases on law school exams. Professors frequently present fact patterns involving expert witnesses and ask students to apply the four Daubert factors to determine admissibility. Students should be prepared to compare the Daubert and Frye standards and explain the judge's gatekeeping function.
Study Tips
- Memorize the four Daubert factors: testability, peer review and publication, error rate, and general acceptance.
- Understand that Daubert factors are non-exclusive and flexible -- the list is illustrative, not exhaustive.
- Be prepared to compare and contrast Daubert with the Frye general acceptance test and explain why Frye was superseded.
- Know that Kumho Tire extended Daubert beyond scientific testimony to all expert testimony, including technical and specialized knowledge.
Read the Full Case Analysis
View the complete brief for Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. including full reasoning, doctrine, and study resources.
More Evidence Dissents
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Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justice O'Connor, concurred in the judgment but objected to overruling Roberts. He argued that the Roberts framework was workable and that the majority's testimonial approach would create significant uncertainty about what constitutes a 'testimonial' statement.
Davis v. Washington
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Justice Thomas concurred in the judgment in Davis but dissented in Hammon, arguing that the primary purpose test was too broad and that only statements involving a degree of formality and solemnity -- such as affidavits, depositions, and prior testimony -- should be considered testimonial.
Ohio v. Roberts
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Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, dissented, arguing that the prosecution had not made a sufficient showing of unavailability. They contended the prosecution's efforts to locate Isaacs were inadequate, failing to check with her employer, school, or other contacts beyond her parents.
Bruton v. United States
391 U.S. 123 (1968) (1968)
Justice White, joined by Justice Harlan, dissented, arguing that the majority underestimated the jury's ability to follow limiting instructions and that the decision would create practical problems for joint trials. He proposed that redaction of the confession to remove the defendant's name would provide adequate protection.
Tome v. United States
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Justice Breyer, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor and Thomas, dissented. He argued that the text of Rule 801(d)(1)(B) does not impose a premotive requirement and that the rule should be read to permit the admission of any prior consistent statement that is relevant to rebut a charge of fabrication, regardless of when it was made.
Old Chief v. United States
519 U.S. 172 (1997) (1997)
Justice O'Connor, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas, dissented, arguing that the prosecution has the right to present its case with the richness and power of evidence that allows jurors to make the case their own. She contended the majority's approach improperly interfered with prosecutorial discretion and would create a slippery slope of defendant-forced stipulations.