Dissent in Ohio v. Roberts
448 U.S. 56 (1980) (1980) · Supreme Court of the United States
Ohio v. Roberts established a two-part test for the Confrontation Clause that governed for nearly a quarter century: an out-of-court statement was admissible if the declarant was unavailable and the statement bore adequate 'indicia of reliability,' either by falling within a firmly rooted hearsay exception or showing particularized guarantees of trustworthiness. Although overruled by Crawford, Roberts remains important for understanding the evolution of confrontation law.
What was the dissent in Ohio v. Roberts?
Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, dissented, arguing that the prosecution had not made a sufficient showing of unavailability. They contended the prosecution's efforts to locate Isaacs were inadequate, failing to check with her employer, school, or other contacts beyond her parents.
Case Overview
Facts
Herschel Roberts was charged with forging a check and possession of stolen credit cards. At a preliminary hearing, Roberts's counsel called the alleged victim's daughter, Anita Isaacs, as a witness and cross-examined her. Isaacs did not appear at trial despite the prosecution's efforts to locate her, including subpoenas sent to her parents' residence and other known addresses. The prosecution introduced Isaacs's preliminary hearing testimony at trial.
Majority Holding
The Court held that the Confrontation Clause requires a two-part inquiry: first, the prosecution must demonstrate the unavailability of the declarant or show that the statement falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception; second, the statement must bear adequate indicia of reliability. Reliability can be inferred when the statement falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception; otherwise, the statement must possess particularized guarantees of trustworthiness. The preliminary hearing testimony satisfied these requirements because Isaacs was unavailable and the defense had an adequate opportunity to cross-examine her.
Majority Reasoning
Justice Blackmun wrote that the Confrontation Clause operates in two ways: it establishes a preference for face-to-face confrontation and provides a mechanism for ensuring the reliability of evidence. The Court acknowledged competing interests between a defendant's right to confrontation and the public's interest in effective law enforcement. The two-part test balanced these interests by requiring unavailability (with certain exceptions for firmly rooted exceptions) and reliability. The Court found that Isaacs's preliminary hearing testimony was reliable because it was given under oath and subject to cross-examination, even if the cross-examination was not as thorough as it might have been at trial.
The Dissenting Opinion
Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, dissented, arguing that the prosecution had not made a sufficient showing of unavailability. They contended the prosecution's efforts to locate Isaacs were inadequate, failing to check with her employer, school, or other contacts beyond her parents.
Key Quotes
“When a hearsay declarant is not present for cross-examination at trial, the Confrontation Clause normally requires a showing that he is unavailable. Even then, his statement is admissible only if it bears adequate 'indicia of reliability.'”
“Reliability can be inferred without more in a case where the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception.”
“In other cases, the evidence must be excluded, at least absent a showing of particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.”
Impact and Legacy
Roberts governed Confrontation Clause analysis for twenty-four years and became deeply embedded in evidence law. Its reliability-based framework, however, was criticized for being manipulable and inconsistent, ultimately leading to its replacement by Crawford's categorical testimonial approach. Understanding Roberts remains essential for comprehending the shift Crawford represents and for analyzing Confrontation Clause issues in jurisdictions that applied Roberts-era precedent.
Exam Relevance
Roberts frequently appears in exam questions asking students to trace the evolution of Confrontation Clause doctrine. Professors may present a pre-Crawford fact pattern and ask students to analyze it under both Roberts and Crawford. Students should understand what changed when Crawford overruled Roberts and be able to articulate the deficiencies in the reliability-based approach.
Study Tips
- Know the two-part Roberts test: unavailability plus adequate indicia of reliability.
- Understand the distinction between firmly rooted exceptions (reliability presumed) and other exceptions (particularized guarantees required).
- Be able to explain why Crawford overruled Roberts and the problems with a reliability-based approach to confrontation.
- Remember that Roberts was the law for 24 years -- many older cases were decided under this framework.
Read the Full Case Analysis
View the complete brief for Ohio v. Roberts including full reasoning, doctrine, and study resources.
More Evidence Dissents
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
509 U.S. 579 (1993) (1993)
Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justice Stevens, concurred in part and dissented in part. He agreed that Frye was superseded but criticized the majority for going beyond the question presented and issuing abstract guidelines. He expressed concern that the majority's factors were vague and would prove difficult for trial judges to apply in practice.
Crawford v. Washington
541 U.S. 36 (2004) (2004)
Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justice O'Connor, concurred in the judgment but objected to overruling Roberts. He argued that the Roberts framework was workable and that the majority's testimonial approach would create significant uncertainty about what constitutes a 'testimonial' statement.
Davis v. Washington
547 U.S. 813 (2006) (2006)
Justice Thomas concurred in the judgment in Davis but dissented in Hammon, arguing that the primary purpose test was too broad and that only statements involving a degree of formality and solemnity -- such as affidavits, depositions, and prior testimony -- should be considered testimonial.
Bruton v. United States
391 U.S. 123 (1968) (1968)
Justice White, joined by Justice Harlan, dissented, arguing that the majority underestimated the jury's ability to follow limiting instructions and that the decision would create practical problems for joint trials. He proposed that redaction of the confession to remove the defendant's name would provide adequate protection.
Tome v. United States
513 U.S. 150 (1995) (1995)
Justice Breyer, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor and Thomas, dissented. He argued that the text of Rule 801(d)(1)(B) does not impose a premotive requirement and that the rule should be read to permit the admission of any prior consistent statement that is relevant to rebut a charge of fabrication, regardless of when it was made.
Old Chief v. United States
519 U.S. 172 (1997) (1997)
Justice O'Connor, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas, dissented, arguing that the prosecution has the right to present its case with the richness and power of evidence that allows jurors to make the case their own. She contended the majority's approach improperly interfered with prosecutorial discretion and would create a slippery slope of defendant-forced stipulations.