Dissent in Tome v. United States
513 U.S. 150 (1995) (1995) · Supreme Court of the United States
Tome resolved a circuit split on the temporal requirement for prior consistent statements under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(B). The Court held that a prior consistent statement is admissible to rebut a charge of recent fabrication or improper motive only if the statement was made before the alleged motive to fabricate arose, thereby preserving the pre-Rules common law premotive requirement.
What was the dissent in Tome v. United States?
Justice Breyer, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor and Thomas, dissented. He argued that the text of Rule 801(d)(1)(B) does not impose a premotive requirement and that the rule should be read to permit the admission of any prior consistent statement that is relevant to rebut a charge of fabrication, regardless of when it was made.
Case Overview
Facts
Matthew Tome was charged with sexually abusing his four-year-old daughter A.T. Following a custody dispute, A.T. made statements to various individuals -- a babysitter, her mother, a social worker, a pediatrician, and others -- describing the alleged abuse. All of these statements were made after A.T.'s alleged motive to fabricate arose (the custody dispute). The prosecution introduced these prior consistent statements through the testimony of six witnesses to rebut the defense's claim that A.T.'s testimony was motivated by a desire to live with her mother.
Majority Holding
The Court held that FRE 801(d)(1)(B) embodies the common law temporal requirement: prior consistent statements are admissible as substantive evidence to rebut a charge of recent fabrication or improper motive only when the statements were made before the charged recent fabrication or improper influence or motive. Post-motive statements have no rehabilitative value for this purpose.
Majority Reasoning
Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, traced the premotive requirement to its common law origins and concluded that Congress intended to preserve this temporal limitation when it adopted Rule 801(d)(1)(B). A post-motive consistent statement does nothing to rebut the charge that the testimony is the product of a recent fabrication or improper motive, because the statement is equally consistent with the existence of that motive. Only a premotive statement has the logical force to rebut the charge. The Court was also concerned about the potential for manufactured evidence, noting that without the premotive requirement, a party could bolster a witness's testimony simply by having the witness repeat the story to multiple people.
The Dissenting Opinion
Justice Breyer, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor and Thomas, dissented. He argued that the text of Rule 801(d)(1)(B) does not impose a premotive requirement and that the rule should be read to permit the admission of any prior consistent statement that is relevant to rebut a charge of fabrication, regardless of when it was made.
Key Quotes
“The prevailing common-law rule for more than a century before adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence was that a prior consistent statement introduced to rebut a charge of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive was admissible if the statement had been made before the alleged fabrication, influence, or motive came into being.”
“The Rule does not permit the introduction of extrinsic evidence for the sole purpose of propping up the witness.”
Impact and Legacy
Tome settled an important circuit split and established a clear temporal rule for prior consistent statements. The decision is significant for trial practice because it limits the prosecution's ability to bolster witness credibility through repetitive out-of-court statements. The 2014 amendment to Rule 801(d)(1)(B) expanded the rule to include statements offered to rehabilitate a declarant's credibility when attacked on another ground, but the premotive requirement remains for statements offered specifically to rebut fabrication charges.
Exam Relevance
Tome is a high-frequency exam topic, particularly in questions involving witness credibility and rehabilitation. Professors often present a witness whose credibility has been attacked on the ground of recent fabrication and then ask whether various prior consistent statements are admissible. The key analytical step is determining when the alleged motive to fabricate arose and whether each statement preceded that point.
Study Tips
- Master the premotive requirement: the prior consistent statement must have been made before the motive to fabricate arose.
- Know the difference between using a prior consistent statement substantively under 801(d)(1)(B) versus using it for rehabilitation purposes only.
- Be aware of the 2014 amendment that expanded 801(d)(1)(B) to include statements offered to rehabilitate credibility when attacked on other grounds.
- Practice timeline analysis in exam fact patterns to determine whether a statement was pre- or post-motive.
Read the Full Case Analysis
View the complete brief for Tome v. United States including full reasoning, doctrine, and study resources.
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Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justice Stevens, concurred in part and dissented in part. He agreed that Frye was superseded but criticized the majority for going beyond the question presented and issuing abstract guidelines. He expressed concern that the majority's factors were vague and would prove difficult for trial judges to apply in practice.
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Justice O'Connor, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas, dissented, arguing that the prosecution has the right to present its case with the richness and power of evidence that allows jurors to make the case their own. She contended the majority's approach improperly interfered with prosecutorial discretion and would create a slippery slope of defendant-forced stipulations.