First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale owned a 21-acre parcel in Mill Creek Canyon within Los Angeles County, which it operated as "Lutherglen," a religious campground and retreat center serving, among others, children and adults with disabilities. In 1978, after a major forest fire in the surrounding area, heavy rains caused severe flooding and debris flows that destroyed or heavily damaged the camp's buildings. In response to the flood hazard, the County adopted an interim ordinance establishing a flood protection area in the canyon and prohibiting construction or reconstruction of buildings within the designated floodplain pending further study and planning. Because of this prohibition, the Church was not permitted to rebuild Lutherglen's facilities on its property. The Church filed an action in California state court alleging, among other claims, that the County's interim ordinance effected a taking of its property by temporarily denying all economically viable use, and it sought damages in inverse condemnation for the period during which the ordinance barred rebuilding. The trial court struck the damages claim, holding that California law limited relief in such regulatory takings cases to declaratory or injunctive relief (i.e., invalidation of the regulation) rather than compensation. The California Court of Appeal affirmed, relying in part on its understanding of Agins v. City of Tiburon as precluding a damages remedy. The California Supreme Court denied review, and the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.
When a land-use regulation is found to have effected a taking of private property, does the Just Compensation Clause require the government to pay monetary compensation for the period during which the regulation was in effect, or is invalidation of the regulation the exclusive remedy?
Under the Fifth Amendment's Just Compensation Clause, applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, when a land-use regulation is adjudged to have effected a taking, the government must pay just compensation for the period during which the taking was in effect. Invalidation or withdrawal of the regulation is not an exclusive or sufficient remedy; compensation is required for temporary as well as permanent takings, unless the government shows the regulation falls within traditional police-power limits (e.g., abating a nuisance) such that no taking occurred.
Yes. If a land-use regulation is ultimately determined to have effected a taking, the government is constitutionally obligated to pay just compensation for the time before the regulation was repealed or invalidated; invalidation alone is not an adequate remedy. The Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings without deciding whether the County's ordinance actually effected a taking on the facts.
The Court began with the text and history of the Just Compensation Clause, emphasizing that it is designed to secure compensation for individuals whose property is taken for public use. The Clause is self-executing with respect to the duty to compensate; when the government has taken property in fact—whether by physical occupation or by regulation that goes "too far"—the Constitution requires compensation for the loss incurred. The Court explained that regulatory actions can constitute takings (citing Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon) and that temporary deprivations of use can be compensable (e.g., temporary physical occupations and floodings in cases such as Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, United States v. General Motors, and United States v. Pewee Coal Co.). There is no principled basis to deny compensation merely because the taking results from regulation rather than physical occupation, or because it is temporary rather than permanent. Addressing the California courts' approach, the Court rejected the notion—purportedly drawn from Agins—that the only remedy for an unconstitutional regulation is to strike it down. While invalidation may prevent future harm, it provides no remedy for the period already endured if a taking occurred. The Court clarified that to the extent Agins suggested invalidation as an exclusive remedy, it was misread and is not controlling. If a regulation is found to have taken property—such as by denying all economically viable use—the government must pay for the time the property was taken from the owner's use and enjoyment. The measure of compensation, the Court noted, would be the value of the use during the regulatory period, akin to rental value. The Court was careful to cabin its decision. It did not decide whether Los Angeles County's ordinance actually effected a taking of the Church's property; that question remained for the state courts on remand. Nor did the Court hold that every interim land-use restriction or moratorium is a taking. The government may defend on remand that the regulation did not go "too far," that normal planning delays are part of the regulatory process, or that the regulation falls within the police power to prevent serious public harm (e.g., nuisance). The decision speaks to remedy: where a taking is proven, compensation is required for the period of the taking, and post hoc invalidation alone cannot satisfy the Constitution.
First English is a remedial milestone in takings jurisprudence. It confirms that the Takings Clause requires monetary compensation for temporary regulatory takings and that invalidation is not a sufficient substitute. The case thereby ensures that property owners have a damages remedy (inverse condemnation) when government regulations—if ultimately found to effect a taking—temporarily deprive them of the use of their property. For law students, the case underscores several doctrinal points: (1) separation of the takings inquiry (did a taking occur?) from the remedy (what is owed if it did?); (2) the compensability of temporary takings; (3) the self-executing nature of the Just Compensation Clause; and (4) the continuing relevance of defenses grounded in the police power (e.g., nuisance). It also foreshadows later cases clarifying the scope of temporary regulatory takings, including Lucas (per se takings where all economic use is denied, subject to background principles) and Tahoe-Sierra (temporary moratoria are not per se takings).
First English transformed the remedial framework of takings law by confirming that damages are the constitutionally mandated remedy when a regulation is found to have taken property, even if the regulation is temporary and later withdrawn. The decision ensures that owners are made whole for the period of deprivation and prevents governments from escaping liability by merely rescinding unlawful regulations after the fact.