Bird executed a formally valid will naming Harrison as the principal beneficiary and personal representative. Sometime thereafter, Bird telephoned her attorney and instructed him to revoke the will. Acting on that instruction, the attorney, in his office and outside Bird's presence, tore the original will into several pieces in the presence of his secretary and mailed the fragments to Bird with a cover letter stating that he had torn up the will at her direction. Bird died without executing a subsequent will. After her death, the attorney's cover letter was found among her personal effects, but the original will (or its fragments) could not be located. Harrison sought to probate a copy of the will, while Bird's heirs contested, arguing that the will had been revoked. The probate court refused probate, and the case ultimately reached the Alabama Supreme Court.
1) Does an attorney's tearing of a will at the testator's direction, but outside the testator's presence, effect a valid revocation by physical act? 2) When a will last known to be in the testator's possession cannot be found at death, does a presumption arise that the testator revoked the will, and was that presumption rebutted here?
Under Alabama law, a will may be revoked by physical act—such as tearing, burning, canceling, obliterating, or destroying—only if performed by the testator, or by another person in the testator's presence and by the testator's direction, with intent to revoke. Separately, if a will last known to be in the testator's possession cannot be found at death (or is found in a mutilated condition), a rebuttable presumption arises that the testator destroyed it with the intent to revoke; the proponent of the will bears the burden to rebut that presumption with sufficient evidence.
The attorney's destruction of the will outside Bird's presence did not itself revoke the will. However, because the will (or its fragments) could not be found at Bird's death and was last known to be in her possession, the presumption arose that Bird herself revoked it. Harrison failed to rebut that presumption. The will was therefore deemed revoked, and probate was properly denied.
The court first applied the revocation-by-physical-act statute. Although Bird directed her attorney to tear the will, the act occurred outside her presence. Because revocation by a third party requires the testator's presence and direction, the attorney's tearing did not satisfy statutory formalities and therefore did not effectuate a revocation at that moment. The analysis did not end there. The court next applied the common-law presumption of revocation. The will had been returned to Bird (as evidenced by the attorney's letter), and at her death neither the original instrument nor its fragments could be found among her effects. Where a will was last in the testator's possession and cannot be located at death, the law presumes the testator destroyed it with intent to revoke. That presumption shifts the burden to the will's proponent to show that the will's absence is consistent with nonrevocation (for example, by proving accidental loss, destruction by a third party without the testator's knowledge, or continued testamentary intent). Harrison's evidence—that the attorney previously tore the will outside Bird's presence—did not rebut the presumption, because those facts merely showed an earlier, legally ineffective attempt to revoke. Once the fragments were mailed back and under Bird's control, the subsequent disappearance of the will supported the inference that Bird herself completed the revocation. With no contrary evidence of mistake, loss, or continued intent to maintain the will, the presumption carried the day, and the court affirmed denial of probate.
Harrison v. Bird clarifies two critical points for Wills and Trusts: (1) Revocation by physical act is formal and strictly construed—direction alone is not enough unless the act occurs in the testator's presence; and (2) the missing-will presumption is powerful and can determine the outcome even when an earlier, improper destruction occurred. For students and practitioners, the case underscores the importance of memorializing revocation through compliant formalities (e.g., executing a revocation instrument or performing the physical act in the testator's presence) and, in litigation, of marshalling concrete evidence to rebut the presumption when probating a lost or destroyed will.
Harrison v. Bird is a careful exposition of how formal revocation requirements and evidentiary presumptions interact. Even though the initial physical destruction of the will did not meet statutory formalities because it occurred outside the testator's presence, later circumstances—specifically, the will's disappearance while in the testator's custody—supported the presumption that the testator ultimately revoked the will.