621 So. 2d 972 (Ala. 1993)
Harrison v. Bird is a staple in Wills and Trusts courses because it neatly illustrates two cornerstone doctrines governing revocation: (1) the statutory requirements for revocation by physical act, and (2) the common-law presumption that a will not found at death, and last known to be in the testator's possession, was destroyed by the testator with intent to revoke.
1) Does an attorney's tearing of a will at the testator's direction, but outside the testator's presence, effect a valid revocation by physical act? 2) When a will last known to be in the testator's possession cannot be found at death, does a presumption arise that the testator revoked the will, and was that presumption rebutted here?
Under Alabama law, a will may be revoked by physical act—such as tearing, burning, canceling, obliterating, or destroying—only if performed by the testator, or by another person in the testator's presence and by the testator's direction, with intent to revoke. Separately, if a will last known to be in the testator's possession cannot be found at death (or is found in a mutilated condition), a rebuttable presumption arises that the testator destroyed it with the intent to revoke; the proponent of the will bears the burden to rebut that presumption with sufficient evidence.
The attorney's destruction of the will outside Bird's presence did not itself revoke the will. However, because the will (or its fragments) could not be found at Bird's death and was last known to be in her possession, the presumption arose that Bird herself revoked it. Harrison failed to rebut that presumption. The will was therefore deemed revoked, and probate was properly denied.
Harrison v. Bird clarifies two critical points for Wills and Trusts: (1) Revocation by physical act is formal and strictly construed—direction alone is not enough unless the act occurs in the testator's presence; and (2) the missing-will presumption is powerful and can determine the outcome even when an earlier, improper destruction occurred. For students and practitioners, the case underscores the importance of memorializing revocation through compliant formalities (e.g., executing a revocation instrument or performing the physical act in the testator's presence) and, in litigation, of marshalling concrete evidence to rebut the presumption when probating a lost or destroyed will.