Two North Carolina residents, Williams and Hendrix, each married to other spouses in North Carolina, traveled to Nevada to obtain divorces under Nevada's six-week residency statute. Each proceeding was ex parte: the nonresident North Carolina spouses did not appear, and service was by publication or otherwise without personal participation. After each obtained a Nevada divorce decree, Williams and Hendrix married each other in Nevada and promptly returned to North Carolina, where they were indicted for bigamy on the theory that North Carolina did not recognize the Nevada divorces. In Williams I (1942), the U.S. Supreme Court reversed their initial convictions because the jury had been told North Carolina could categorically disregard Nevada divorces; the Court held that a sister state must accord at least prima facie validity if the rendering court had jurisdiction based on domicile. On retrial, North Carolina introduced evidence that Williams and Hendrix never acquired bona fide domiciles in Nevada (e.g., they stayed only the statutory minimum, maintained ties to North Carolina, and intended to return immediately). A jury found that neither party was truly domiciled in Nevada, and both were again convicted of bigamy. The North Carolina Supreme Court affirmed, and the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari, leading to Williams II.
Does the Full Faith and Credit Clause require a state to recognize an ex parte divorce decree from a sister state without allowing the forum state to reexamine the divorcing party's domicile, or may the forum, upon finding no bona fide domicile in the rendering state, refuse recognition and sustain bigamy convictions?
A state must give full faith and credit to a sister state's divorce decree only if the court that rendered the decree had jurisdiction, which in divorce depends on at least one spouse's bona fide domicile in the rendering state. When a divorce is obtained ex parte—without the personal appearance of the other spouse and where the forum state was not a party—another state may collaterally attack the decree by reexamining the jurisdictional fact of domicile. The rendering court's recitals of jurisdiction are not conclusive against strangers to the proceeding; such a decree is entitled to prima facie, not conclusive, validity. If the forum finds no bona fide domicile in the rendering state, it may decline full faith and credit and treat the marriage status as unchanged.
North Carolina could reexamine whether the parties were domiciled in Nevada and, upon a jury finding that they were not, refuse full faith and credit to the Nevada ex parte divorce decrees. The convictions for bigamy were sustained.
The Court emphasized that full faith and credit extends only to judgments rendered by courts with jurisdiction. In divorce, jurisdiction turns on domicile—a constitutional minimum that cannot be conferred by consent or minimal, transitory presence. Because the Nevada proceedings were ex parte, neither the absent spouses nor North Carolina were parties bound by any Nevada determination of domicile, and thus the Nevada decrees could be collaterally attacked in North Carolina by showing lack of bona fide domicile. The Court rejected the argument that the Full Faith and Credit Clause compels uncritical acceptance of the rendering court's jurisdictional recitals; to do so would allow parties to manipulate marital status through sham residencies, undermining the interests of other states in regulating marriage and protecting absent spouses. The Court noted that Williams I established that ex parte divorces are entitled to prima facie validity if the rendering court had jurisdiction. Williams II clarifies that such validity is rebuttable by contrary proof of non-domicile in a subsequent proceeding—here, a criminal prosecution for bigamy. The jury's finding that the parties went to Nevada solely to secure divorces, without intending to remain, supported the conclusion that Nevada lacked jurisdiction. Therefore, North Carolina was not constitutionally compelled to treat the Nevada decrees as dissolving the prior marriages. Neither due process nor full faith and credit was violated by allowing the forum state to determine the underlying jurisdictional fact and, on that basis, to withhold recognition and enforce its bigamy laws.
Williams II is a foundational case in conflict of laws and constitutional law, clarifying that recognition of sister-state divorce decrees hinges on jurisdiction grounded in domicile. It permits collateral attack on ex parte divorces by states and third parties who were not before the rendering court. The decision tempers the reach of Williams I by emphasizing that full faith and credit does not immunize jurisdictional evasion. For students, it illustrates (1) the domicile prerequisite for divorce jurisdiction, (2) the difference between prima facie and conclusive recognition, (3) the collateral attack doctrine against ex parte judgments, and (4) the state's retained authority to regulate marital status and enforce criminal laws. Later cases, such as Sherrer v. Sherrer and Coe v. Coe (1948), limited collateral attack when both spouses actually litigated domicile, underscoring Williams II's focus on ex parte decrees.
Williams v. North Carolina II strikes a careful balance between the constitutional command to respect sister-state judgments and a state's sovereign interest in regulating family status. By permitting collateral inquiry into domicile for ex parte divorces, the Court guarded against the manipulation of marital status through fleeting residencies while preserving the integrity of truly jurisdictionally sound decrees.