Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1945) (U.S. Supreme Court)
Williams v. North Carolina II sits at the core of the Full Faith and Credit Clause's intersection with family law and state sovereignty.
Does the Full Faith and Credit Clause require a state to recognize an ex parte divorce decree from a sister state without allowing the forum state to reexamine the divorcing party's domicile, or may the forum, upon finding no bona fide domicile in the rendering state, refuse recognition and sustain bigamy convictions?
A state must give full faith and credit to a sister state's divorce decree only if the court that rendered the decree had jurisdiction, which in divorce depends on at least one spouse's bona fide domicile in the rendering state. When a divorce is obtained ex parte—without the personal appearance of the other spouse and where the forum state was not a party—another state may collaterally attack the decree by reexamining the jurisdictional fact of domicile. The rendering court's recitals of jurisdiction are not conclusive against strangers to the proceeding; such a decree is entitled to prima facie, not conclusive, validity. If the forum finds no bona fide domicile in the rendering state, it may decline full faith and credit and treat the marriage status as unchanged.
North Carolina could reexamine whether the parties were domiciled in Nevada and, upon a jury finding that they were not, refuse full faith and credit to the Nevada ex parte divorce decrees. The convictions for bigamy were sustained.
Williams II is a foundational case in conflict of laws and constitutional law, clarifying that recognition of sister-state divorce decrees hinges on jurisdiction grounded in domicile. It permits collateral attack on ex parte divorces by states and third parties who were not before the rendering court. The decision tempers the reach of Williams I by emphasizing that full faith and credit does not immunize jurisdictional evasion. For students, it illustrates (1) the domicile prerequisite for divorce jurisdiction, (2) the difference between prima facie and conclusive recognition, (3) the collateral attack doctrine against ex parte judgments, and (4) the state's retained authority to regulate marital status and enforce criminal laws. Later cases, such as Sherrer v. Sherrer and Coe v. Coe (1948), limited collateral attack when both spouses actually litigated domicile, underscoring Williams II's focus on ex parte decrees.