Dissent in Bourjaily v. United States
483 U.S. 171 (1987) (1987) · Supreme Court of the United States
Bourjaily established two important principles for the co-conspirator hearsay exception under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E). First, the court may consider the contents of the proffered statement itself in determining whether the foundational requirements of the exception are met. Second, the existence of a conspiracy and the declarant's and defendant's participation in it must be established by a preponderance of the evidence under Rule 104(a).
What was the dissent in Bourjaily v. United States?
Justice Blackmun, joined by Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall, concurred in part. Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment. There was no formal dissent, but Justices expressed reservations about bootstrapping and the potential for circularity in using the statement to prove its own admissibility.
Case Overview
Facts
Clarence Bourjaily was charged with conspiracy to distribute cocaine and distribution of cocaine. An informant cooperating with the FBI arranged a drug sale with Angelo Lonardo. In recorded telephone conversations, Lonardo made statements indicating that he and Bourjaily were involved in a drug distribution conspiracy. At trial, the government introduced Lonardo's out-of-court statements under the co-conspirator exception.
Majority Holding
The Court held that a court may consider the hearsay statement sought to be admitted in determining whether the prerequisites for the co-conspirator exception are satisfied. The standard of proof is preponderance of the evidence under Rule 104(a). The Court rejected the argument that the co-conspirator's own statements cannot be used bootstrapping-style to establish the conspiracy's existence and the defendant's involvement.
Majority Reasoning
Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, reasoned that Rule 104(a) requires the court to make a preliminary determination of admissibility and that this determination is not itself subject to the rules of evidence (except privileges). Because the Rules of Evidence do not apply to the preliminary determination, the court may consider the hearsay statement itself. The Court noted that this approach is consistent with the broader scheme of the Rules. While the statement alone might be insufficient to establish the conspiracy, it may be considered alongside other evidence. The preponderance standard was appropriate because Rule 104(a) places the burden on the proponent to establish the foundational facts.
The Dissenting Opinion
Justice Blackmun, joined by Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall, concurred in part. Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment. There was no formal dissent, but Justices expressed reservations about bootstrapping and the potential for circularity in using the statement to prove its own admissibility.
Key Quotes
“We hold that when the preliminary facts relevant to Rule 801(d)(2)(E) are disputed, the offering party must prove them by a preponderance of the evidence.”
“There is little doubt that a co-conspirator's statements could themselves be probative of the existence of a conspiracy and the participation of both the defendant and the declarant in the conspiracy.”
“A court, in making a preliminary factual determination under Rule 104(a), may consider any evidence relevant to the issue, including the hearsay statement itself.”
Impact and Legacy
Bourjaily significantly eased the admission of co-conspirator statements by allowing courts to consider the statement itself as part of the foundation for its admissibility. The 1997 amendment to Rule 801(d)(2) codified and modified Bourjaily, providing that the contents of the statement shall be considered but are not alone sufficient to establish the foundation. The decision is practically important because co-conspirator statements are among the most frequently used hearsay exceptions in criminal cases.
Exam Relevance
Bourjaily is regularly tested in connection with co-conspirator statements under Rule 801(d)(2)(E). Exam questions typically ask students to identify the foundational requirements -- existence of a conspiracy, declarant's participation, defendant's participation, and statement made during and in furtherance of the conspiracy -- and analyze whether the court can use the statement itself to establish these facts. Students should also know the post-1997 amendment limitation that the statement alone is not sufficient.
Study Tips
- Know the four foundational requirements for co-conspirator statements: conspiracy existed, declarant was a member, defendant was a member, and statement was made during and in furtherance of the conspiracy.
- Understand the bootstrapping issue: the statement can be considered in determining its own admissibility, but is not alone sufficient (post-1997 amendment).
- Remember that the standard of proof for these preliminary facts is preponderance of the evidence under Rule 104(a).
- Distinguish Bourjaily's Rule 104(a) approach from Huddleston's Rule 104(b) approach for Rule 404(b) evidence.
Read the Full Case Analysis
View the complete brief for Bourjaily v. United States including full reasoning, doctrine, and study resources.
More Evidence Dissents
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Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justice Stevens, concurred in part and dissented in part. He agreed that Frye was superseded but criticized the majority for going beyond the question presented and issuing abstract guidelines. He expressed concern that the majority's factors were vague and would prove difficult for trial judges to apply in practice.
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Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, dissented, arguing that the prosecution had not made a sufficient showing of unavailability. They contended the prosecution's efforts to locate Isaacs were inadequate, failing to check with her employer, school, or other contacts beyond her parents.
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Justice Breyer, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor and Thomas, dissented. He argued that the text of Rule 801(d)(1)(B) does not impose a premotive requirement and that the rule should be read to permit the admission of any prior consistent statement that is relevant to rebut a charge of fabrication, regardless of when it was made.