Dissent in Idaho v. Wright
497 U.S. 805 (1990) (1990) · Supreme Court of the United States
Idaho v. Wright addressed the Confrontation Clause requirements for hearsay admitted under residual or catch-all exceptions. The Court held that when hearsay is admitted under an exception that is not 'firmly rooted,' the statement must possess particularized guarantees of trustworthiness derived from the totality of the circumstances surrounding the making of the statement, not from corroborating evidence. Although decided under the now-overruled Roberts framework, its analysis of reliability remains influential.
What was the dissent in Idaho v. Wright?
Justice Kennedy, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White and Blackmun, dissented. He argued that corroborating evidence should be considered in assessing trustworthiness, reasoning that the majority's approach was too restrictive and would exclude reliable evidence in child abuse cases where the child cannot testify.
Case Overview
Facts
Laura Lee Wright was charged with lewd conduct with a minor based on allegations that she and her cohabitant Robert Giles sexually abused her two daughters, aged two and a half and five and a half. A pediatrician, Dr. Jambura, interviewed the younger child and elicited statements identifying Giles as the abuser. The child did not testify at trial. The prosecution introduced her statements to the pediatrician under Idaho's residual hearsay exception.
Majority Holding
The Court held that hearsay admitted under a residual or non-firmly-rooted exception must bear particularized guarantees of trustworthiness derived from the totality of the circumstances that surround the making of the statement and that render the declarant particularly worthy of belief. Corroborating evidence may not be considered in assessing trustworthiness for Confrontation Clause purposes.
Majority Reasoning
Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority, reasoned that the residual exception is not a firmly rooted hearsay exception because it is designed as a catch-all provision for statements not covered by established exceptions. Therefore, the Roberts framework required a showing of particularized guarantees of trustworthiness. The Court held that this assessment must focus on the circumstances surrounding the making of the statement itself -- such as spontaneity, consistency, mental state, use of age-appropriate terminology, and absence of a motive to fabricate -- rather than on corroborating evidence. To consider corroboration would be to bootstrap reliability and effectively eliminate the protections of the Confrontation Clause.
The Dissenting Opinion
Justice Kennedy, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White and Blackmun, dissented. He argued that corroborating evidence should be considered in assessing trustworthiness, reasoning that the majority's approach was too restrictive and would exclude reliable evidence in child abuse cases where the child cannot testify.
Key Quotes
“To be admissible under the Confrontation Clause, hearsay evidence used to convict a defendant must possess indicia of reliability by virtue of its inherent trustworthiness, not by reference to other evidence at trial.”
“The relevant circumstances include only those that surround the making of the statement and that render the declarant particularly worthy of belief.”
“The use of corroborating evidence to support a hearsay statement's trustworthiness would permit admission of a presumptively unreliable statement by bootstrapping on the trustworthiness of other evidence at trial.”
Impact and Legacy
Idaho v. Wright set important limits on the admission of hearsay under residual exceptions, particularly in child abuse cases. Its holding that corroborating evidence cannot be used to establish trustworthiness was significant for protecting confrontation rights. Although the Roberts framework it applied was later overruled by Crawford, the case's analysis of the circumstances surrounding the making of a statement continues to inform courts assessing hearsay reliability under various exceptions.
Exam Relevance
Idaho v. Wright is commonly tested in the context of hearsay from child witnesses and residual exceptions. Professors may present a fact pattern involving a child's out-of-court statement to a doctor or social worker and ask whether it satisfies the Confrontation Clause. Students should know to focus on the circumstances of the statement itself, not corroborating evidence. Post-Crawford, the analysis shifts to whether the statement is testimonial.
Study Tips
- Remember the key distinction: trustworthiness must come from circumstances surrounding the making of the statement, not from corroborating evidence.
- Know the factors for assessing trustworthiness: spontaneity, consistency, declarant's mental state, age-appropriate language, and absence of motive to fabricate.
- Understand that this case applied the Roberts framework, which Crawford later overruled -- but the analysis of statement-making circumstances remains relevant.
- Consider how Idaho v. Wright intersects with Crawford: if the statement is testimonial, Crawford controls regardless of reliability.
Read the Full Case Analysis
View the complete brief for Idaho v. Wright including full reasoning, doctrine, and study resources.
More Evidence Dissents
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
509 U.S. 579 (1993) (1993)
Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justice Stevens, concurred in part and dissented in part. He agreed that Frye was superseded but criticized the majority for going beyond the question presented and issuing abstract guidelines. He expressed concern that the majority's factors were vague and would prove difficult for trial judges to apply in practice.
Crawford v. Washington
541 U.S. 36 (2004) (2004)
Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justice O'Connor, concurred in the judgment but objected to overruling Roberts. He argued that the Roberts framework was workable and that the majority's testimonial approach would create significant uncertainty about what constitutes a 'testimonial' statement.
Davis v. Washington
547 U.S. 813 (2006) (2006)
Justice Thomas concurred in the judgment in Davis but dissented in Hammon, arguing that the primary purpose test was too broad and that only statements involving a degree of formality and solemnity -- such as affidavits, depositions, and prior testimony -- should be considered testimonial.
Ohio v. Roberts
448 U.S. 56 (1980) (1980)
Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, dissented, arguing that the prosecution had not made a sufficient showing of unavailability. They contended the prosecution's efforts to locate Isaacs were inadequate, failing to check with her employer, school, or other contacts beyond her parents.
Bruton v. United States
391 U.S. 123 (1968) (1968)
Justice White, joined by Justice Harlan, dissented, arguing that the majority underestimated the jury's ability to follow limiting instructions and that the decision would create practical problems for joint trials. He proposed that redaction of the confession to remove the defendant's name would provide adequate protection.
Tome v. United States
513 U.S. 150 (1995) (1995)
Justice Breyer, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor and Thomas, dissented. He argued that the text of Rule 801(d)(1)(B) does not impose a premotive requirement and that the rule should be read to permit the admission of any prior consistent statement that is relevant to rebut a charge of fabrication, regardless of when it was made.